AN EXAMINATION OF A DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PURCHASE PROGRAM FOR ALASKA AGRICULTURAL LANDS by Workman, William G. et al.
AN EXAMINATION OF A 
{DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PURCHASE 
PROGRAM FOR ALASKA 
AGRICULTURAL LANDS
W illiam  G. Workman 
Edward L. Arobio 
Anthony F. Gasbarro
Agricultural Experiment Station 
University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, Alaska
A report submitted to the Department of Natural Resources, State of Alaska, 
in accordance with terms of research contract CC10 1142.
January, 1979
AN EXAMINATION OF A DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PURCHASE PROGRAM 
FOR ALASKA AGRICULTURAL LANDS
William G. Workman 
Edward L. Arobio 
Anthony F. Gasbarro
Agricultural Experiment Station 
University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, Alaska
A report submitted to the Department of Natural Resources, State of 
Alaska, in accordance with terms of research contract OCTO 1142.
A L A S K A
||£> January, 1979
3 . 1 I 
M  
y J i s i
i- 2~ I
RASMUSON UIBRARTt 
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA-FAl RBANKI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION.......................................   1
Overview........................................................   1
Plan of Report.......................................   2
MARKET FAILURE AND THE ALLOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 
RESOURCES ......................    3
AGRICULTURAL LAND CONVERSION IN ALASKA. .  ...................  10
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALASKA. . . .  16
Introduction.......................................    16
Present Agricultural Situation................................  16
Agricultural Lands for Future Development .  ...............  23
Future Agricultural Development in Alaska . . . .  ........... 27
PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS.........................    32
Suffolk County. . . .  ............................  33
History.  ................................... . . . . . . .  35
Maryland................................................    36
New Jersey, Massachusetts and Connecticut . .  ............... 37
Definition of Development Rights. . .  ............... .. . . 38
Strengths and Weaknesses of Development Rights Purchases. . . 42
APPLICABILITY OF A DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAM IN ALASKA . . . .  44
Introduction...............   44
Development Rights Survey in Alaska . .  .....................  44
Response.......................   44
Farm Size of Respondents .  .......................   46
Interest-in Selling Development Rights .................  * 48
Market Values of Cleared and Uncleared Agricultural Lands. 48
Value of Development Rights.....................   53
Distance from a Population Center, Interest in Selling 
Development Rights, and Perceived Value of Develop­
ment Rights .........................................  . 56
Economic Size Agricultural Operations ........................ 58
Potential Costs of a Purchase of Development Rights Program . 61
Other Costs..............................  66
Benefits of Development Rights Acquisition.....................  68
Maintenance of the Local Agricultural Economy.............  69
Locally Produced Food............  .........................  71
Open Space and Other Public Good Amenities  ............... 73
Removal of Uncertainty ..................................... 74
OTHER AGRICULTURAL LAND CONTROL TOOLS ............................ 75
Comparison of Agricultural Land Preservation Tools............. 77
TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED
Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS............................   78
REFERENCES...............................................t . . . . 83
APPENDIX A: OPERATION OF PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
PROGRAMS.............................................. 88
APPENDIX B: ALASKA AGRICULTURAL LANDS SURVEY..............   96
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS. . . ........  98
APPENDIX D: ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND CONTROL TECHNIQUES. . 103
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T Relationship of Subdivision Activity to Priority
Agricultural Lands. . . . . .  ..........................  14
2 Respondents in Each Farm Size Class by Region. . . . . .  47
3 Degree of Interest in Selling Development Rights to
Agricultural Lands..........................  49
4 Perceived Market Values of Cleared and Uncleared Lands
(Dollars per Acre) ...............    . 51
5 Value of Development Rights (Dollars per Acre) . . . . .  54
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1 Location of Major Subdivision Activity in the Matanuska-
Susitna Borough, 1974-1977.  ........... 13
2 Examples of Matanuska-Susitna Borough Land Prices . . . . .  . . 15
3 Total Value of Agricultural Production (In Thousands of
Dollars) 1960-1977. . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  17
4 Estimated Value of Product by Area (In Thousands of Dollars)
1960-1977 .  ..........    18
5 Sales of Agricultural Products - 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
6 Estimated Value of Sales by Type of Product (Value to Farmer
in Thousands of Dollars) 1960-1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7 Average Cropland Utilization, 1971-1976 . .  ...........  . . . 2 4
8 Ranking of Agricultural Lands by State of Alaska (Thousands
of Dollars) ......... . . . . .  . . . . .  • • • . • t . . . 26
9 Land Status of Agricultural Lands . . t . . . . . . .  . . ... . . 28
10 Estimated Alaska Consumption and Production for Agricultural
Commodities for the Year 2000 . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  29
11 Acreage Necessary for Estimated Alaska Agricultural Production
for the Year 2000  ..........   30
12 Questionnaire Response by Region.  ............................. 45
13 Average Perceived Land Values by Region (Dollars per Acre). . . 52
14 Average Development Rights Values (Dollars per Acre). . . . . .  55
15 Farm Distance from Nearest Community Related to Degree of
Interest* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ................ . . 57
16 Relationship Between Development Rights Value and Distance
from Palmer................................   59
17 Estimated Purchase Costs of Alternative Development Rights
Purchase Programs.......................   . . . 62
18 Estimated Costs of Development Rights Purchases to Maintain
the Watanuska Dairy Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
19 Comparison of Alternative Agricultural Land Preservation
Tools .  .......... ................. .. . . 78
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Many Alaskans are concerned about the conversion of highly productive 
agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses now occurring in the state.
Land on the urban fringes of Anchorage and Fairbanks that once produced 
vegetables and grains or supported dairy farms appears most vulnerable 
to this conversion. As major population centers grow, residential, 
shopping center and industrial land uses displace agriculture because 
they render greater returns. This displacement is viewed by some as not 
being in society's best interest. Those concerned about the loss of 
agricultural lands argue that these lands are some of the best agricul­
tural lands in the state and are vital to maintaining the agricultural 
economy of the state. In addition, it is suggested that their preser­
vation will help to maintain a much desired way of life and to provide 
needed open space.
The state and municipal governments in Alaska have made attempts to 
intervene in the land market to slow down or stop agricultural land 
conversion. Methods employed to date include tax incentives and the 
sale of only the agricultural rights on state or municipal lands. This 
report discusses the feasibility of an alternative means of preserving 
agricultural lands, namely, the public purchase of development rights 
from private landowners. Under this voluntary arrangement, private 
agricultural landowners would be compensated for giving up their option 
to develop their land for nonagricultural purposes.
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Plan of Report
In discussing the feasibility of a program designed to purchase 
the development rights from Alaskan farmland owners, we begin with a 
section that very briefly describes the operation of the market in its 
resource allocation function. In this section our goal is to establish 
an analytical framework for examining how market forces may result in 
nonoptimal amounts of land being allocated ttf agricultural purposes.
The second section of the report presents information on the 
nature and magnitude of agricultural land conversion in Alaska. This 
is followed by a review of the state's agricultural economy and its 
potential. Next is a section that describes development rights purchase 
programs operating in other locations in the United States. We then 
discuss the applicability of such a program in Alaska and review other 
possible agricultural land preservation tools that might be used either 
separately or in combination with a development rights purchase plan. 
Finally, we summarize the report and offer some conclusions.
MARKET FAILURE AND THE ALLOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND RESOURCES1
In a market economy most resource allocation issues are settled 
through voluntary exchange. The interaction of resource and commodity 
owners with those desiring possession of these resources and commodities 
establishes their exchange values and simultaneously determines what is 
produced, how this production takes place, and how the proceeds from 
economic activities are distributed. The market system is an effective 
framework for performing these functions in cases where resources can be 
readily parceled out to individual owners, where competition exists, and 
where the individual is in a position to capture all the benefits and is 
obligated to bear all the costs associated with his actions. In other 
instances, however, where one or more of these conditions is absent, 
unfettered private enterprise fails to perform this allocating function 
in an efficient manner. As a result, privately determined resource use 
patterns may differ from what society views as optimal.
The use of unobstructed exchange to allocate land resources is one 
instance in which failures in the market system are alleged to lead to 
nonoptimal patterns of resource use. As a result, social control over 
land use has been a pervasive force in this country since colonial times 
(Clawson, 1974). The range of governmental influences over private land 
use decisions in modern times seems to reflect a widespread distrust of 
the free market as an efficacious performer of the land allocation
1 This section draws heavily on B. Delworth Gardner, "The Economics of 
Agricultural Land Preservation," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 59, No. 5, December 1977.
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function. The agricultural land market is currently receiving con­
siderable attention in this regard. For various reasons the developing 
pattern of nonagricultural use of these lands is viewed by many as not 
being in society's best interest. As a consequence," governments at all 
levels have begun to intervene in this market, experimenting with 
various means to slow or prevent the conversion of high productivity 
lands to other uses.
While "market failure" has been offered as the justification for 
public intervention in land use decisions, the removal of the market 
from the allocation task and the substitution of essentially nonmarket 
criteria characteristic of many agricultural land preservation programs 
should be accompanied by some specific rationale. The purpose of this 
section of the report is to provide a framework for examining how market 
forces may result in a nonoptimal amount of land being allocated to 
agricultural purposes.
We may begin by asking what benefits accrue to society from the 
existence and preservation of agricultural activities and lands, there 
appear to be at least four jointly produced benefits: (a) food and
fiber to meet the demands of growing regional, national and world 
populations; (b) local economic benefits that derive from an agricul­
tural industry; (c) open space and other environmental amenities that 
accrue chiefly to urban residents, and (d) more efficient, orderly, and 
fiscally sound urban development. In addition, one might list the 
preservation of a "lifestyle" or "way-of-1 ife" as one of the joint 
benefits of a general policy aimed at preserving agricultural land.
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Given that these are the joint benefits that may be achieved by 
retaining land in agriculture, the key question becomes why won't the 
land market allocate socially optimal quantities to agricultural use? 
What is the rationale for extramarket social action?
First, if some of these joint benefits from land are public or 
collective goods, then the free market will not allocate land among uses 
efficiently. Collective goods have two distinguishing characteristics:
(1 ) the impossibility of excluding consumers who do not pay for the good 
in question and (2 ) consumption by one consumer does not reduce the 
quantity of the good available to others (Mishan, 1969). So if the good 
is a collective good (such as open space), the cost of making that good 
available to one more individual would be zero. This suggests that the 
socially optimal price of the good would also be zero. At a zero price, 
obviously no private businessman would be willing to invest in supplying 
collective goods. The market simply cannot handle the supply problem. 
With public goods there is also a problem with the demand side of the 
allocation mechanism. -Since no one can be excluded from consumption, 
whether or not he pays for the good, individuals have an incentive to 
not reveal their true willingness to pay for the good. Provided the 
good were made available, an individual could benefit from its presence 
and become a "free rider."
Externalities are another reflection of market failure and may be 
defined as unpriced or improperly priced effects emanating from produc­
tion or consumption that impinge on the satisfaction of third parties 
(Mishan, 1976). But establishing that external effects exist may not 
automatically mean that extramarket corrective action is called for.
This depends on the costs of negotiating mutally satisfactory arrange­
ments to establish liability for the externality (Coase, 1960). Still, 
the existence of unnegotiated or uncompensated external effects, i.e., 
a divergence between private and social costs, may be another example of 
market failure in land allocation among uses and a justification for 
social action.
A third source of market failure is the concentration of power by 
sellers or buyers in either the product or input markets. There appear 
to be no advocates of intervention in the agricultural land market who 
have justified their positions on the basis of such concentration in 
the markets for land.
Another argument for social interference in the market is that some 
products are so-called "merit goods. 11 For example, there are some "food 
fundamentalists" who have argued that food is such a basic human need 
that the private land market should not be allowed to determine the 
acreage devoted to food production. Rather, the view is that food and 
fiber should be provided to all as a "right" and should not be governed 
by market criteria.
Returning now to the joint products or benefits alleged to be 
significant in agricultural land retention, we will want to see if there 
are elements of market failure that justify the removal of the market 
from land allocation decisions. Consider first the food and fiber 
products of agriculture. Food and fiber are clearly private goods where 
exclusion of nonpaying customers poses no problem. Thus, the public 
good source of market failure is absent. The externality argument also
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seems to lack relevance here since significant external effects are not 
obvious in the consumption of food and fiber. On the other hand there 
may be external diseconomies in the production of food and fiber (such 
as in the use of chemicals), but this would suggest too much effort in 
agricultural production--not too little. Of course, if land and these 
chemicals were good substitutes rather than complements, less chemicals 
and more land might well be more efficient.
The "merit good" argument concerning food and fiber is more diffi­
cult to deal with. If one believes that food and fiber are somehow 
special (like safety, education and outdoor recreation apparently are), 
this may suggest setting prices below marginal supply costs. Even such 
a cheap food policy should, however, require that a given amount of food 
and fiber be produced at minimum opportunity cost to society. Some 
system will be required to establish land values within agricultural 
uses and between agricultural and other uses. It is not clear that this 
can be better accomplished by removing land allocation from the market 
and replacing it with some noneconomic criteria.
Some may argue that income and wealth differences within and among 
regions may justify agricultural land preservation through social actions 
in order to prop up a local agricultural industry. This argument seems 
important only if the concern is for some immobile farm workers who may 
benefit if local land is left in agriculture. Other decision makers 
across the spectrum of agriculture--farm operators, processors, suppliers, 
transporters, university professors in agricultural fields and government 
agency personnel— have obvious stakes in a viable agricultural industry. 
However, these are generally not poor people. In addition, they are 
typically mobile so can adjust to changing land use patterns.
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Consider now agricultural land policy and its relationships to 
urban development. If highly productive agricultural land cannot be 
developed for urban purposes, demand shifts to parcels not so zoned, 
thus conferring wealth gains on owners of theser parcels. Whether the 
result is a more or less efficient urban development, however, is not 
clear. It depends on where these parcels are, how efficient they are 
in producing urban amenities, what the costs are of bringing public 
utilities and transport to these parcels, etc. In addition, it is not 
obvious, without examining specific situations, that urban "leap-frogging" 
would be reduced over what the free market might produce.
Finally, we come to the case where land market failure is most 
apparent--in the creation of open space and environmental amenities.
These benefits are collective goods and there are elements of important 
external effects here too. Since market signals are absent with regard 
to the production of these collective goods, there is little evidence 
available as to how much these amenities are worth. It would seem, 
however, that their value would be much higher on the urban fringe of
Anchorage or Fairbanks than in the Big Delta area of the Interior. In J
any case, the market will not provide the optimal quantity of these
amenities and there may be some justification for social action to
remedy this failure.
As a final point in this section, the main issue with the question 
of preserving agricultural land appears to be the economic trade-offs at 
the rural-urban fringe (Gardner, 1975). The primary reason for the 
inefficiency of agricultural production at the fringe is the extreme 
amount of uncertainty associated with the likelihood of land shifts.
Farmers appear to have no incentive to invest optimally, especially in 
durable capital, if the probability is high that they cannot capture the 
returns from agricultural production. As a result, land is wasted and 
society suffers the loss of foregone agricultural crops. This may be 
the principal rationale for some form of land reserve program.
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AGRICULTURAL LAND CONVERSION IN ALASKA
Most of the agricultural lands in Alaska that have been converted 
to nonagricultural uses are in the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys. It is 
from this area only that information is available about the nature and 
magnitude of the change. Smaller quantities of agricultural land have 
been lost around Fairbanks and communities on the Kenai Peninsula but 
their magnitude has not been documented.
The demand for land in the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys is linked to
several factors (Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 1978, p. 31):
1. Growth of Anchorage coupled with a limited supply of 
land in its immediate vicinity.
2. Natural attractiveness of the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys 
for housing and recreational homesites.
3. Improved access to Anchorage with completion of the
Parks Highway.
4. Selection of the Capital Site near Willow.
5. Speculative forces resulting from all of the above.
The Matanuska-Susitna Borough is undergoing rapid growth1. The 
principal factor in the Borough's recent development has been its 
relationship to the Anchorage Metropolitan area. In the 1960's the 
Borough served primarily as a recreation area for Anchorage citizens. 
As Anchorage began to grow rapidly, rising housing prices within the 
city and the desire of many people for more living space led to the 
outward expansion of the urban area. Since Anchorage is confined by
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military bases, mountains and the sea, metropolitan growth spread out 
along the highway south to Kenai and north to the Matanuska-Susitna 
Valleys. Improved access, such as completion of the Parks Highway, 
accelerated this spread. The population of the Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough which had grown by 2.8 percent annually between 1960 and 1970, 
grew by 20.6 percent annually between 1970 and 1976 (Capital Site 
Planning Commission, 1978, p. 108).
A major part of Borough growth has come from residental subdivi­
sions, most of which have developed in the Palmer-Wasilla area and in 
the townships contiguous to the Parks Highway from Willow north to 
Talkeetna. In 1966 there were approximately 10,000 subdivided lots in 
the Matanuska-Susitna Borough; by 1976 there were 32,000 lots (Capital 
Site Planning Commission, 1978, p. 118). Most of these did not have any 
improvements on them. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough (1978) reported 
that between 1974 and 1978, 460 subdivision plats were submitted for 
approval; 300 of these are approved to date. The 460 plats represent 
25,760 acres or 12,824 separate lots.
It is not known exactly how much of the subdivided acreage has 
occurred on agricultural lands. Some of the subdivisions are located in 
wooded upland areas not suitable for agriculture but within the agricul­
tural zone. Within the Palmer-Butte area, 27 farms have been subdivided 
within the last three years. Many of the subdivisions along the Parks 
Highway between Willow and Talkeetna are occurring on agricultural land. 
Subdivision growth in the Wasilla-Big Lake area is occurring for the 
most part on marginal agricultural lands.
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Table 1 shows the key areas of subdivision activity in the Matanuska- 
Susitna Borough between 1974 and 1977. Nearly half of the acres sub­
divided during these years occurred in the six townships surrounding 
Palmer and Wasilla. Figure 1 shows the relationship of subdivision 
activity to priority agricultural lands. Much of this activity has 
occurred on the more productive and accessible agricultural land.
The increased demand for land is reflected in increased land prices. 
Examples of prices for farmland, residental and commercial land are 
shown in Table 2. In the mid-1960's farmland was selling for about $50 
per acre. In 1977, the Matanuska-Susitna Borough sold farmland with 
agricultural rights only for $100-700 per acre. Farmland purchased 
without any restrictions was selling for $1 ,000-4,000 per acre.
Agricultural land and nonagricultural land purchased for subdivision 
purposes or individual lots close to the population centers of the Matanuska- 
Susitna Borough were selling for between $2,500 and $45,000 per acre depend­
ing on improvements and location. Commercial land in or close to Palmer 
and Wasilla is being purchased for $7,800 to $145,000 per acre.
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TABLE 1
LOCATION OF MAJOR SUBDIVISION ACTIVITY IN THE 
MATANUSKA-SUSITNA BOROUGH, 1974-1977.
Location
No. of 
Townships Subdivisions Acres Lots
Matanuska Valley in Vicinity 
of Palmer and Wasilla
6 138 7,977 4,081
Remainder of Matanuska 
Valley
22 101 7,213 3,655
Willow-Talkeetna Strip 8 15 1,925 850
SOURCE: Capital Site Planning Commission, Socio-Economic Impact
Analysis for Juneau and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 
Background Report No. 10, Prepared by Rivkin Associates, 
(Washington: Rivkin Associates Inc., 1978), pp. 119-120.
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FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP OF SUBDIVISION ACTIVITY 
TO PRIORITY AGRICULTURAL LANDS
Priority Agricultural 
Land with Priority Ranks
Heavily Subdivided 
Townships
Sources: Capital Site Planning Commission,
Socio-Economic Impact Analysis for Juneau and 
the Matanuska Borough. Background report No. ij 
1978;
Alaska Department of Natural Resources maps 
showing agricultural potential on file in 
Anchorage Office, 1978:
TABLE 2
EXAMPLES OF MATANUSKA-SUSITNA BOROUGH LAND PRICES.
Year Location Remarks Price
FARMLAND
mid-1960's Mat-su $50/acre
Mat-su Uncleared Agricultural
Land Sold by Borough -
Agricultural Rights Only $100-700/acrea
Mat-su Farmland for Speculation $ 1,000-4,000/acre
RESIDENTIAL
1977 Butte $25,000 for 5 acres
Palmer City Utilities $ 7,500 for 7,200 sq. ft.
Settlers Bay All Services $16,000 for 1 / 2  acre
Wasilla Improved Lot $1 2 ,000-$l3,000/acre
Wasilla Lake View Lot $1 2 ,000-$l3,000/acre
S.W. Wasilla Lake View $35,000 for 5 acres
Willow $22,550 for 3 lots
Rustic Wilderness Subdivision $ 8,000-$1 2 ,000/acre
Trappers Creek $ 2,500-$ 4,000/acre
North of Talkeetna $ 4,000/acre
COMMERCIAL
1977 Palmer $87,000-$145,000/acre
Palmer Industrial Park, All $ 7,800/acre
Services
Wasilla Highway Frontage $35,000 for 1/2 acre
Wasilla $1,000,000 for 27 acres
Wasilla Lots near Airport $240,000 for 4 acres
(offer refused)
Wasilla to Houston Highway Frontage $3-5/sq. ft.
North of Talkeetna Highway Frontage $1 2 ,000/acre
a Based on the sale of 3,125 acres of land.
SOURCE: Capital Site Planning Commission, Socio-Economic Impact Analysis for Juneau
and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, Background Report No. 10, Prepared by 
Rivkin Associations (Washington: Rivkin Associates Inc., 1978), p. 129.
Matanuska-Susitna Borough, "Agricultural Land Sale - May 10, 1977" (mimeo­
graphed), from office records, Palmer, Alaska.
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PRESENT AND POTENTIAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALASKA
Introduction
This section attempts to provide a perspective for evaluating the 
need to purchase development rights from existing private agricultural 
lands. First, we will look at present agricultural production in the 
State. Most of this production is occurring on lands that would be 
considered in a development rights purchase program. Second, we will 
consider the agricultural land base that is available for future agri­
cultural production. Finally we will discuss the future demand for 
agricultural land in Alaska.
Present Agricultural Situation2
The total value of agricultural production when expressed in 
constant prices has declined slightly since 1960 (Table 3). Expressed 
in 1967 dollars, the value of production declined from $6,010,000 in 
1960 to $5,514,000 in 1977. If inflation were not taken into account, 
the value of production figures expressed in current prices would be 
misleading. Both the relative value agriculture's contribution to the 
State's economy and the real value of agricultural production have 
declined.
The Matanuska-Susitna Valley continues to be the dominant agricul­
tural region in the State. Statistics in Table 4 show that since 1960, 
over 70 percent of the agricultural production has come from this region.
2 Much of the material for this section was taken from the agricultural 
discussion in the Alaska Statistical Review, 1972, pp. 181-190.
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TABLE 3
TOTAL VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION9
(In Thousands of Dollars)
1960-1977
Year Value of Production
Current Prices Constant Prices*3
1960 $5,517 $6,010
1961 5,651 6,089
1962 5,781 6,250
1963 5,451 5,849
1964 5,860 6,241
1965 5,518 5,858
1966 5,560 5,679
1967 5,524 5,524
1968 5,353 5,217
1969 4,574 4,263
1970 5,476 4,911
1971 5,474 4,789
1972 5,997 5,130
1973 6,987 5,644
1974 8,080 5,771
1975 9,226 5,861
1976 8,802 5,252
1977 9,777 5,514
a Does not include reindeer products.
k Deflated using Anchorage Consumer Price 
Index for all Commodities, 1967 = 100.
Source: Alaska Department of Commerce and 
Economic Development, The Alaska Economy» 
(Juneau: Alaska Department of Commerce and 
Economic Development, 1977), p. 80. While 
a more appropriate index for deflating this 
time series of production figures would be 
the wholesale price index for farm products, 
this index is not available for Alaska.
SOURCE: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting
Service, Alaska Agricultural Statis- 
tics, (Palmer: Alaska Crop and Live­
stock Reporting Service, 1978); Alaska 
Department of Economic Development, 
Alaska Statistical Review, (Junuea: 
Alaska Department of Economic Devel­
opment, 1972), pp. 181-190.
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1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED VALUE OF PRODUCT BY AREA
(In Thousands of Current Dollars)
1960-1977
Matanuska Tanana Kenai
Valley Valley Peninsula Southeast Southwest
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value %
$3,663 67 $ 907 * 16 $ 278 5 $ 264 4 $ 272 5
3,945 69 842 14 326 5 219 3 319 5
3,939 68 938 16 334 5 217 3 348 6
3,721 68 781 14 383 7 174 3 357 6
4,017 68 872 14 333 5 156 2 458 7
3,406 63 950 17 481 8 134 2 414 7
3,793 69 847 12 453 8 33 1 559 10
3,876 70 673 12 397 7 30 1 548 10
3,021 74 399 10 159 4 8 •V4. 483 12
3,260 71 448 10 305 7 29 1 532 12
4,003 73 634 12 263 5 37 1 541 10
4,102 75 676 12 206 4 22 ’ * 467 9
4,615 77 917 15 219 4 14 >  s 231 4
5,116 73 1,246 18 274 : 4 1 345 5
6,181 76 1,060 13 405 5 17 - 416 5
6,602 72 1,791 19 506 5 10 - ■ 317 3
6,488 74 1,532 17 407 5 9 _ 365 4
7,282 74 1,601 16 597 6 12 284 3
Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Alaska Agricultural 
Statistics, (Palmer: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service,
1978); Alaska Department of Economic Development, Alaska Statistical 
Review, (Juneau: Alaska Department of Economic Development, 1972). 
pp. 181-190.
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The Tanana Valley has produced about 14 percent of the State's agricul­
tural commodities. The Southwest, Kenai and Southeast regions follow 
with seven percent, six percent and one percent, respectively.
The most important agricultural commodities produced in the State 
are shown in Table 5. Milk is by far the most important commodity 
accounting for nearly 40 percent of the total value of agricultural 
production in 1977. Hay comprised 19 percent of the total and potatoes 
ten percent. Eggs were next with eight percent. Other vegetables, rein­
deer, barley and oats each accounted for either five or six percent of 
the total production value. Beef and veal comprised four percent of the 
total while other meats such as poultry, pork, lamb and mutton accounted 
for two percent. Wool and silage amounted to one percent or less.
Patterns in the value of production do not fully describe tendencies
in agriculture in the State. There have been substantial structural 
changes in Alaska agriculture since Statehood. Since 1959, the monetary 
return to the farmer for many goods declined in real purchasing power.
In addition, the industry came under increasing competitive pressure 
from imported foods because of changes in production technology in 
other states and due to more efficient transportation.
Alaska's dairy industry has changed dramatically to meet the 
challenge of outside competition. The small, poorly capitalized family 
farms have given way to modern, relatively capital intensive commercial 
dairies. The number of commercial dairies has decreased from approxi­
mately 80 in 1960 to 13 in 1977. Average income from milk per dairy has 
increased from approximately $25,000 in 1960 to $211,000 in 1977. Grain 
and vegetable farms have also followed the pattern of becoming more capi­
tal intensive and increasing production unit size.
19
TABLE 5
SALES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS - 1977
Product Value of Sales Percent
Milk $2,832 39
Hay 1,391 19
Potatoes 715 10
Eggs 600 8
Other Vegetables 444 6
Reindeer 421a 5
Barley & Oats 400 5
Beef & Veal 323 4
Other Meats 169 2
Wool 44 1
Silage 4b C  * i
TOTALS $7,339 100
a Includes antlers, hides and other by products 
b Estimated.
SOURCE: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting
Service, Alaska Agricultural Statistics 
(Palmer, Alaska Crop and Livestock 
Reporting Service, 1978).
20
Another change in the dairy industry has been its geographical 
consolidation, In 1960, the Matanuska Valley produced 80 percent of the 
State's milk; now it produces 96 percent (Alaska Crop and Livestock 
Reporting Service [ACLRS], p. 48). The decline of production in the 
other regions is due in part to their relatively higher production 
costs.
The production and sales of the State's most important agricultural 
commodities have remained fairly-constant. Milk output and sales have 
varied little in the past eight years. Production has ranged between 
18.0 and 16.6 million pounds (ACLRS, 1978, p. 49). Hay production has 
also remained relatively stable, but from 1975 through 1977 annual sale 
value was more than twice that in 1974 (ACLRS, 1978, p. 21). This was 
due to the purchase of hay by Alyeska Pipeline Company for potential oil 
spills and to the increased demand generated by the recreational horse 
industry. Sales to the pipeline company have now ceased, but the demand 
for horse hay is expected to continue. Potato production and sales like­
wise have not increased significantly since 1970. This commodity is 
limited to the fresh market only because of the lack of potato processing 
facilities. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to develop 
frozen food processing facilities in the Matanuska Valley. The esti­
mated value of sales for various agricultural products is provided in 
Table 6.
The total amount of land utilized for crop production in the State 
has remained fairly constant since 1970. Total land in crops from 1971 
through 1976 averaged nearly 19,300 acres annually. The Matanuska-
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TABLE 6
ESTIMATED VALUE OF SALES BY TYPE OF PRODUCT
(Value to Farmer in Thousands of Current Dollars)
1960-1977
Year Milk Potatoes
, Other 
Vegetables! Eggs Hay Silage Grain Beef Rei ndeer
Other
Meats2
1960 $2,277 $614 $192 $454 $ 96 ■kf
* ro $116 $122 $132 $81
1961 2,584 651 196 410 205 17 121 116 136 98
1962 2,340 576 229 400 202 17 115 237 139 83
1963 2,284 467 195 369 58 30 115 209 137 51
1964 2,067 889 202 328 104 28 109 247 180 73
1965 1,954 576 185 584 132 10 84 279 183 120
1966 1,881 520 197 661 186 4 118 350 168 107
1967 1,867 503 204 586 110 8 107 350 188 100
1968 1,807 538 269 483 132 6 96 292 253 113
19693 1,853 290 155 335 11 2 13 26 329 212 86
1970 1,994 449 238 343 142 22 36 330 236 113
1971 1,838 502 298 420 176 24 47 273 195 11 1
1972 1,963 658 270 488 336 10 94 278 170 105
1973 2,107 949 261 546 396 18 338 309 178 103
1974 2,449 884 361 499 715 8 106 332 210 146
1975 2,700 940 367 408 1,794 11 256 306 341 95
1976 2,725 870 426 553 1,513 4 238 403 457 105
1977 2,832 715 444 600 1,391 - 400 323 4 421 169
1 Includes primarily lettuce, carrotsand cabbage.
2 Includes pork, poultry, lamb, and mutton.
3 Declines due to low rainfall and early freeze.
SOURCES: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Alaska Agricultural Statistics, (Palmer: Alaska Crop
and Livestock Reporting Service, 1978); Alaska Department of Economic Development, Alaska Statis­
tical Review, (Juneau: Alaska Department of Economic Development, 1972), pp. 181-190.
Susitna area and the Tanana Valley accounted for 59 and 29 percent of 
this acreage, respectively. The Kenai Peninsula averaged 11 percent of 
the annual total. Cropland utilization statistics are shown in Table 7.
Agricultural Lands for Future Development 
Agricultural lands that are currently being converted to non- 
agricultural uses are not the only lands available for future develop­
ment. While these lands are close to the State's major population 
centers and are felt by some to be the most valuable for agriculture, 
they are being converted because the market has placed a higher value on 
them for other uses. It may well be that other lands suitable for 
agriculture further out from existing agricultural areas will replace 
the lands being converted. The purpose of this section is to provide 
a brief overview of the supply of potential agricultural lands, particu­
larly those adjacent to existing agricultural areas.
The Soil Conservation Service (Alaska Rural Development Council, 
1974, p. 130) has identified approximately 15.2 million acres of poten­
tial agricultural land throughout the State. Because many of these 
lands are away from population centers and are without surface trans­
portation access, there is little chance of their developing before the 
turn of the century. There are, however, some lands in the Tanana 
Valley and the Matanuska-Susitna-Kenai area that are closer to popula­
tion centers and accessible by surface transportation.
The Alaska Department of Natural Resources (1976) has conducted an 
analysis of the agricultural lands identified by the Soil Conservation
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AVERAGE CROPLAND UTILIZATION, 1971-1976.
TABLE 7
REGION
Crops
Tanana
Valley
Matanuska-Susitna
Valleys
Kenai
Peninsula Southwest State Total
Commercial
Vegetables 197 551 i 19 767
Feed Crops 3,655 3,578 568 7,801
Harvested
Grassland 1,815 7,163 1,580 142 10,700
Total 5,667 11,292 2,167 142 19,268
Percent 29.4 58.6 11.3 .7 100
SOURCE: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, A1aska Agricultural 
Statistics (Palmer: Alaska Crop and Livestock ReDortina Service. 
1978), p. 17.
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Service and rated these lands by certain criteria^ in order to arrive at 
a priority ranking of agricultural lands in the State for state selection. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.
It is not surprising that the high priority potential agricultural 
lands are in the State's most important existing agricultural areas 
since these areas already have a sizable population and existing trans­
portation facilities. What is significant is the large amount of 
potential agricultural acreage in these areas. If one considers all 
agricultural lands in the three most important agricultural areas, 
regardless of priority, there are nearly six million acres available,
32 percent of all agricultural lands in the State. If all priority 
categories but the top six are eliminated, the six mi 1 1 ion acres is 
reduced to 3.8 million, still a healthy amount of land. The top six 
priority rankings include lands that are relatively unconstrained by 
access and demands for other uses and could come into production in a 
reasonable amount of time. Even if the 3.8 million acres are reduced by 
1.5 million to account for existing agricultural and nonagricultural 
uses, the 2.3 million acres could provide substantial agricultural 
development.^
^ These criteria include: (1) present and future access possibilities;
(2) productive capability; (3) need for conservation practices; (4) 
local needs for agricultural products; (5) demand for other uses of 
agricultural lands; (6) variety of crops that could be grown; (7) timing 
of agricultural development, and (8) local socioeconomic impact.
4 Although this discussion shows that large quantities of potential 
land are available, at this time its not certain how much, if any, 
of these lands eventually will come into production since they could 
be classified by the State for other uses.
TABLE 8
RANKING OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS BY STATE OF ALASKA9 
(Thousands of Acres)
Priority
Tanana
Valley
Matanuska-Susi tna 
Anchorage Kenai Total
% of 
Priority 
Rank
Other
Areas
% of 1  
Priority! 
Rank Jj
1 182.4 206.0 -0- 388.4 TOO -0- -0- 1
2 288.0 230.4 -0- 518.4 100 -0- -0-
3 345.6 230.4 -0- 576 100 -0- -0-
4 537.4 175.0 475.2 1,187.6 85 20 1.6 15
5 -0- 216.4 239.2 455.6 100 -0- -0- I
6 447.0 192.0 -0- 639.0 89 76.8 11
7 374.4 -0- -0- 374.4 16 1,895.0 84 ^
8 259.2 134.0 73.0 466.2 67 227.2 . 33 1
9 367.2 258.6 -0- 625.8 39 979.2 61
10 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 334.3 TOO
11 81.0 -0- -0- 81.0 13 610.4 87
12 231.4 -0- -0- 231.4 18 1,078.0 82 i
13 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 311.4 100
14 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 1 ,295.6 100
15 195.8 -0- -0- 195.8 12 1,491.5 88
16 192.0 46.0 -0- 238.0 2> 897.6 79
17-23 -0- -0- -0- -0- 4-0- 3,421.8 ;oo
Totals 3,50J.4 1 ,688.8 787.4 5,977.2 32 12,820.2 68
a These figures include all lands with agricultural potential regardless of current use.
SOURCE: Alaska Department of Natural Resources, "Priority Values of Agricultural Land 
for State Selection" (mimeograph), Anchorage: Alaska Department of Natural
Resources, 1978.
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Not all of the potential agricultural lands are in State ownership. 
In an effort to gain an idea of the amount of identified agricultural 
lands held by the State, we examined land status data^ for the Tanana 
Valley and the Matanuska-Susitna Basin. The result of this analysis is 
shown in Table 9. In the Tanana Valley, the State will eventually 
receive title to 1.6 million acres (48 percent) of the agricultural 
land. In the Matanuska-Susitna Basin, 91 percent of the potential 
agricultural land will be in state ownership. No attempt was made to 
estimate the percentage of state control by priority rankings, but the 
very high percentage of state agricultural lands in the Matanuska- 
Susitna region assures that most of the high priority land there will 
be in state ownership.
Future Agricultural Development in Alaska 
In order to get some idea of the future agricultural land demand 
in Alaska, this section will review a recent study made by the Univer­
sity of Alaska (Thomas, 1976) involving projections for agriculture to 
the year 2000. Assuming: (1) a state population of 820,000; (2) that
Alaska would still produce only part of its total consumption; and (3) 
that Alaska's consumption patterns will be the same as those in the 
other 49 states, the study predicted the quantity of different types of 
commodities that would be produced in Alaska and the amount of land that 
would be needed in the different regions. This information is presented 
in Tables 10 and 11. At the time of this study, plans had not yet been
 ^ Computer printouts of land status made available by the Alaska Depart­
ment of Natural Resources, Anchorage, Alaska.
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TABLE 9
LAND STATUS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
Area
Agricultural
Area3 State Lands
STATUSb
Native
Lands
Federal
Land
Tanana Valley 3,433 1,639 (48%) 293 1,500
Matanuska-Susitna 1,0 0 1 912 (91%) 075 014
Total 4,433 2,551 (58%) 368 1,514
a Figures are less than those shown in Table 8 because private 
and municipal agricultural lands are not included.
b Anticipated status after state selections and settlement of the 
Native Claims Settlement Act.
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TABLE 10
ESTIMATED ALASKA CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 
FOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES FOR THE YEAR 2000
Product
Alaska
Consumption
2000
Alaska
Production
2000
Beef (mil Lbs. Dressed Weight) 95.5 11.5
Pork (Mil Lbs. Dressed Weight) 51.7 20.7
Lamb & Mutton (Mil Lbs. Dressed Weight) 0.8 .0
Reindeer (Mil Lbs. Dressed Weight) 0.8 2.6
Milk (Mil Lbs.) 200.0 100.0
Eggs (Mil Doz.) 13.4 6.7
Vegetables & Potatoes (Thousand Ton) 79.3 36.2
Fruit & Berries (Thousand Ton) 1.4 .7
SOURCE: Wayne Thomas, "Agriculture in Alaska: 1976-2000 A.D."
in Review of Business and Economic Conditions, Vol. XIII, 
No. 2 (Fairbanks: Institute of Social, Economic and
Government Research, June, 1976), p. 18; Alaska Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service, Alaska Agricultural 
Statistics (Palmer: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting 
Service, 1978).
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TABLE 11
ACREAGE NECESSARY FOR ESTIMATED ALASKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
FOR THE YEAR 2000
Reindeer
Commodity Matanuska-Susitna Tanana Kenai Kodiak Range
DCCI .
Barley 5,000~
Hay/Silage 14,900&
Pasture 8,300
Range 921,000
Other 17,700
Pork
Barley 13,500
Other 8,400
Reindeer
Range 20,000,000
Milk
Barley 1,400a 8,000
Oats 1,000a 3,300
Hay/Silage 3,600a 10,000
Other 3,800 13,300
Eggs
Barley 2,900
Other 1,800
Veqetable-Fruit 
Crop 1,950 650
Other 1,300 450
Total Acreage 13,050 62,300 45,900 921,000 20,000,000
a A total of 5,700 acres of barley, 2,200 acres of oats and 6,600 acres of
hay/silage will be produced in Tanana Valley for Matanuska-Susitna dairies.
b A total of 3,400 acres of barley and 10,100 acres of hay/silage will be
produced on the Kenai and shipped to Kodiak.
SOURCE: Wayne Thomas, "Agriculture in Alaska: 1976-2000 A.D." In Review of
Business and Economic Conditions, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fairbanks: 
Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, June, 1976).
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formulated to undertake large scale production of barley and rapeseed 
for export. Thus no acreage figures are given for this type of enter­
prise. It would not be unrealistic to assume that barley and rapeseed 
production for export would require 500,000 acres of land above that 
shown in Table 11. The value of the 1976 study is in anticipating the 
different types of agricultural operations that may take place on a 
regional basis and how much land would be involved. This is particu­
larly important in the Matanuska-Susitna area where nonagricultural uses 
are likely to be most predominant, especially if a new State Capital is 
placed in Willow.
As can be seen in Table 10, Alaska's production of agricultural 
products in the year 2000 is anticipated to be many times greater than 
current levels, particularly in the production of red meat. The esti­
mate of agricultural acreage that would be needed by the year 2000 
(Table 11) suggests that most of the cropland acreage would be needed in 
the Tanana and Kenai areas. Acreage requirements in the Matanuska- 
Susitna area are predicted to be only slightly above the current level 
of 11 ,2 0 0 because it is anticipated that much of the feed for the 
Matanuska-Susitna dairies will be grown in the Tanana Valley. If the 
dairy industry in the Matanuska-Susitna area grows its own feed, then 
another 14,500 acres would be required bringing the total to 27,500 
acres. It should be noted that excluding acreage from the production of 
barley and rapeseed for the export market, Alaska's needs for cropland 
in the year 2000 would be only about 120,000 acres. If 500,000 acres 
were put into production (most likely in the Tanana Valley) for barley 
and rapeseed, the total would amount to 620,000 acres.
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PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Development rights** are one of the many rights associated with real 
property. They are analogous to other property rights such as mineral 
rights or water rights. Specifically, development rights are the right 
of the landowner to develop his land beyond its current use. Because 
these rights can be separated from the total bundle of rights associated 
with a parcel of real property, they can be sold, thus transferring from 
the landowner the right to develop his land. This, then, is the concept 
behind the purchase of development rights as an agricultural land control 
device. In order that land remain in agriculture in areas in which it 
is being converted rapidly to other uses, governments could purchase 
development rights from agricultural lands. These lands, because there 
are no development rights associated with them, could not be put to more 
developed uses.
6 Governments may acquire less than fee simple rights in land. These 
are commonly called easements and can be of a positive or negative 
nature. As defined by Ishee (1977, pp. 89-90), "A positive easement 
transfers certain decision making responsibilities associated with 
access from the fee simple, private owner to another. . . . Thus, 
some governments have acquired accessibility rights to some lands for 
the promotion of selected recreational activities such as hunting, 
fishing, and trapping. A negative easement, though failing to grant 
accessibility rights to others, restricts the fee simple owner from 
certain activities such as construction of billboards which destroy 
natural, scenic views, or the destruction of trees and shrubs." 
Purchases of development rights are examples of negative easements.
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Although development rights purchase programs have been debated 
in several states, 7 only Suffolk County in New York State and Maryland 
have begun, or will begin shortly, extensive purchases of development 
rights specifically from agricultural land.® In addition, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut have enacted recently more limited pro­
grams of development rights acquisitions from farmland (Bardin and 
Alampi, 1977; Fellows, 1978). Our purpose in this section will be, 
therefore, to review briefly these five programs. (More information 
on the operation of the programs in Suffolk County, Maryland, and New 
Jersey, as well as an evaluation of Suffolk County's program, is pro­
vided in Appendix A.) We start with Suffolk County, New York.
Suffolk County
The Suffolk County development rights purchase program is a reaction 
to residential growth in the county and is an attempt to limit that 
population growth. Suffolk County is located on the central and eastern 
portions of Long Island, approximately 40 miles from New York City.
7 For discussions of several of these proposals see Sidney Ishee, 
"Transferable Development Rights as a Means of Influencing Land 
Use Patterns," IN: Economic Issues in Land Use Planning-Western 
Rural Development Center, Special Report No. 3, Oregon State Uni­
versity Agricultural Experiment Station, Special Report No. 469, 
1977; and Lawrence W. Libby and Mark D. Newman, Land Use Planning 
and Policy - Michigan in Perspective, Michigan Cooperative Extension 
Service E-1061, Michigan State University, February, 1977.
8 Wisconsin had some of the earliest experience with purchase of 
development rights when it began a program of scenic easement acqui­
sitions along a Mississippi River highway in 1951. Because this 
program was not aimed specifically at keeping land in agriculture,
a discussion of this program is not included in this report.
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Rapid residential growth has taken place in the western half of the 
county in recent years; the eastern half of the county remains essen- 
ially rural in nature. Despite this development, Suffolk is still New 
York State's leading agricultural county with approximately $70 million 
in annual gross agricultural sales (Lesher and Eiler, 1977, p. 6). The 
major agricultural enterprises in this county include potatoes, flowers, 
sod, ducks, vegetables, and nursery stock. Approximately 55,000 acres 
of farmland are located within the eastern portion of the county, the 
remaining 5,000 acres lying in western Suffolk County. In 1976, the 
population of Suffolk County was estimated at 1,240,000 residents.
The passage of the purchase of development rights program was a 
response to the increasing suburbanization of Suffolk County. However, 
this desire to limit growth was expressed as three objectives. These 
were: "(1 ) preservation of a viable agricultural economy; (2 ) mainte­
nance of an aesthetically pleasing rural environment; and (3) local 
tax savings" (Lesher and Eiler, 1977, p. 11). This tool was selected 
by Suffolk County because of the failure of other land control techniques 
in limiting growth in other semi-urban areas. The techniques that have 
proven to be ineffective in suburbanizing areas include zoning, use 
value assessment, and agricultural districting.
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History9
Prior to 1972, local concern for the preservation of farmland in 
Suffolk County was not expressed at the county level. This changed in 
1972 when a newly elected county executive appointed an Agricultural 
Advisory Committee to investigate means of retaining land in agricul­
ture. In 1974, the Agricultural Advisory Committee's final report 
recommended that county funds be used to purchase the development rights 
to large tracts of farmland. During 1974, each farmland owner in the 
county was asked to submit a sealed bid giving his asking price for 
the sale of the development rights to his land. By February, 1975, the 
county had received 381 offers to sell development rights on 17,000 
acres for $117 million, an average of approximately $6,900 per acre.
In April of 1975, the county evaluated these bids and recommended to the 
county legislature that an attempt be made to purchase the development 
rights to 14,000 acres. Anticipated cost was $84 million. On May 11, 
1976, a package of resolutions needed for the implementation of the 
proposed was tabled, however, by a vote of 10 to 8.
Following this vote, public support for the program intensified, 
and on September 8, 1976, a special session of the county legislature 
passed a package of 11 resolutions authorizing a $21 million program of 
bond sales to purchase the development rights to 3,883 acres. It was 
planned to expand the program through 1979, eventually purchasing the 
development rights to 15,000 acres.
9 This history of Suffolk County's purchase of development rights pro­
gram is taken largely from J. V. Klein, Letter and enclosure dated 
August, 1974; and William G. Lesher and Doyle A. Eiler, Farmland 
Preservation in an Urban Fringe Area: An Analysis of Suffolk County's
Development Rights Purchase Program, A.E. Research 77-3, Cornell Uni­
versity, March, 1977.
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As of July 15, 1978, the development rights from 3,342 acres had 
been purchased. Because of the recession which hit the state of New 
York in late 1975 through 1977, land values decreased and the develop­
ment rights to these 3,342 acres were purchased for $ 12 million, an 
average of approximately $3,590 per acre. With the remaining $9 million 
from the initial authorization of $21 million, plus additional sums as 
may be required under the total current Suffolk County legislative 
authorization of $55.5 million, the county hopes to complete the pur­
chase of development rights to approximately 15,000 acres of farmland by 
the end of 1979.
Maryland
Maryland was one of the first states to attempt specifically to 
preserve land in agriculture. In fact, it was the first state (1956) in 
the United States to enact use-value assessment as a means of accom­
plishing this goal. Because of the limited effectiveness of use-value 
assessment in keeping land in agriculture, and following a report by the 
Maryland secretary of agriculture in 1974, bills were introduced in the 
Maryland|legislature in 1975, 1976, and 1977 to enact a program of 
establishing agricultural districts and purchasing development rights 
from farmland as methods of maintaining farms in production. The 1977 
proposal was signed into law and fiscal 1980 is expected to be the first 
year in which development rights are purchased (Musselman, 1978). 
Development rights will be purchased by the Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Foundation. Funding is to be provided by general or 
special fund appropriations and by grants or transfers from governmental 
or private sources.
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut^0 
On July 22, 1976, New Jersey passed legislation authorizing a 
demonstration program of development rights acquisitions from farmland 
(P.L. 1976 c. 50). The act, entitled the "Agricultural Preserve 
Demonstration Program Act," is to be funded by a $5 million appropria­
tion from the New Jersey State Recreation and Conservation Land Acqui­
sition and Development Fund. Purchases are to be completed by the end 
of 1978. One year after acquisitions are finalized, a report evaluating 
the program's success is due the New Jersey state legislature.
Massachusetts and Connecticut have also enacted limited programs of 
development rights purchases. In both these states, purchases are to be 
made through the sale of $5 million in state bonds. At the state level, 
the Massachusetts program is to be administered by the "agricultural 
land preservation committee." This committee will evaluate purchase 
proposals that are submitted by local governments and will select those 
to be funded. Local administration of the program is expected to be 
provided by local conservation commissions.
In June, 1978, Connecticut authorized a pilot program of develop­
ment rights purchases. Land priorities for the program are to include 
lands which have high food production potential and are likely candi­
dates for development in the near future. As of September, 1978, 107 
owners of farmland in Connecticut had offered to sell the development 
rights to 7,400 acres (Fellows, 1978). The first purchases are antici-
Sources for this section are (1) New Jersey P.L. 1976 c. 50,
(2) Connecticut Public Act No. 78-232, and (3) Irving F. Fellows, 
Personal Communication, September 13, 1978.
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pated to take place in November or December of 1978, following final 
selection of criteria for selecting among offers. An evaluation of the 
pilot program is to be submitted to the Connecticut General Assembly by 
December 1979.
Definition of Development Rights
At this point it is useful to discuss the rights purchased under 
a development rights acquisition program. We can do this by comparing 
the definitions that are being used in existing programs. All current 
programs purchase all rights to develop, except for agricultural pur­
poses, and therefore require the land to remain in agriculture. Nor­
mally a definition of agricultural use is also provided in the legisla­
tion authorizing development rights purchases.
In the Suffolk County program, "Development right shall mean the 
permanent legal interest in the use of all lands for any purpose other 
than agricultural production" (Local Law No. 19, Suffolk County, New 
York, 1974). Agricultural production is defined as "the production for 
commercial purposes of crops, livestock, and livestock products, but not 
land or portions thereof for processing or retailing merchandising of 
such crops, livestock and livestock products. . . ."
In Maryland, a development rights easement is defined as "an 
encumbrance upon land which restricts the owner's rights to develop, or 
otherwise use the land for other than agricultural use (Maryland 
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation Regulations - Draft, 1978). 
Further, farm use is defined as "any use of land which directly con­
tributes to the production, primary processing or storage of agricul­
tural' products." 4,
38
New Jersey defines development easement as "the purchase of an 
interest in agricultural land, specifically, the right to develop, or 
change the use of the land from active agricultural use to a more inten­
sive use, such as residential, industrial, or commercial (New Jersey 
P.L. 1976 c. 50). As "prime farmland" is one of the major criteria for 
inclusion in the demonstration project, prime farmland is defined as 
"lands classified as land use capability I, II, or III in accordance 
with the National Cooperative Soil Survey prepared under U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Soil Conservation guidelines. . .and such unique farm­
lands currently used for the production of cranberries, blueberries and 
other specialty crops" (Joint Rules and Regulations Concerning Farmland 
Preservation Demonstration Project, 1977).
Connecticut defines development rights as "the rights of the fee 
simple owner of agricultural land to develop, construct on, sell, lease, 
or otherwise improve the agricultural land for uses that result in 
rendering such land no longer agricultural land, but shall not be con­
strued to include. . .the rights of the fee owner of agricultural land 
to develop, construct, sell, lease or otherwise improve the agricultural 
land to preserve, maintain, operate or continue such land as agricul­
tural land, including but not limited to construction thereon of resi­
dences for persons directly incidental to farm operation and buildings 
for animals, roadside stands and farm markets for sale to the consumer 
of food products and ornamental plants, facilities for the storing of 
equipment and products or processing thereof of such other improvements, 
activities and uses thereon as may be directly or incidentally related 
to the operation of the agricultural expertise. . . . "  (Connecticut 
Public Act No. 78-232).
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Four important questions related to development rights purchases 
need discussion: (1 ) what is the right of the owner to sell his land?
(2) can improvements be made on the land? (3) is the building of resi­
dences allowed? and (4) are mechanisms provided for repurchase of 
development rights?
None of the legislation in Suffolk County, Maryland, New Jersey, or 
Connecticut removes the right of the landowner to sell or lease his 
land, in whole or in part. However, if land is sold as either whole 
parcels or as subdivided segments, the land must stay in agriculture as 
defined in the various states' legislation and regulations.
Next, what development can take place on the farm after the devel­
opment rights are sold? In Suffolk County, it seems that buildings and 
structures directly related to agricultural production would be allowed 
(Lesher and Eiler, 1977, p. 15). However, development related to pro­
cessing or merchandising of crops and livestock would be prohibited.
The Maryland program allows for primary processing and storage of agri­
cultural products (Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation 
Regulations, 1978-Draft). New Jersey allows facilities to be built for 
use in retail merchandising of agricultural products produced on the 
farm, subject to several restrictions, e.g., no more than two acres may 
be devoted to a retail merchandising facility (Joint Rules and Regulations 
Concerning Farmland Preservation Demonstration Project, 1977). the 
Connecticut program is the most specific of the four programs regarding 
construction of buildings and allows for buildings for animals, roadside 
stands, farm markets, and storage facilities for equipment (Connecticut 
Public Act No. 78-232).
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The Suffolk County program allows housing to be built for the farm 
owner and full-time employees. In Maryland, a landowner who has sold 
his development, rights may request to use one acre or less for his and 
his children's residential use (Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation Regulations, 1978-Draft)* In addition, housing may be 
permitted for tenants as long as construction does not exceed one tenant 
house per 100 acres. New Jersey permits the construction of new resi­
dences for the household which derives its primary income from the farm 
(Joint Rules and Regulations Concerning Farmland Preservation Demonstration 
Project, 1977). Also, residences are allowed for labor employed on the 
farm. The Connecticut program allows for the building of residences for 
persons directly incidental (directly incidental has not been specifically 
defined) to the farm operation (Connecticut Public Act No. 78-232).
The intent of purchase of development rights programs is that the 
land remain in agriculture in perptuity. However, existing programs 
include provisions to allow the landowner to regain development rights 
under special conditions, typically if farming becomes unprofitable.
In Suffolk County, development rights can be resold to the land­
owner only if voters agree in a countywide referendum (Newton, 1975, p. 5). 
These development rights can revert only to the land from which they 
originally came. The Maryland program allows for the repurchase of 
development rights after 25 years if farming becomes unprofitable and 
if approval is granted by the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation and the local county government (Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Regulations, 1978-Draft). New Jersey allows for the sale 
of development rights purchased by the state only with the approval of
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the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, the Secretary of Agricul­
ture, the State House Commission and following a public hearing at least 
one month prior to any final approval (P.L. 1976 c. 50). In Connecticut, 
repurchase of development rights are to be initiated by a petition from 
the farmland owner to the local governing body (Connecticut Public Act 
No. 78-232). If the petition is approved by the governing body of the 
town in which the farm is located, approval is next sought from the 
Commissioner of Agriculture. The Commissioner can approve the petition 
only if he determines there is an overriding necessity in the public 
interest to relinguish the development rights. Final approval will come 
from a referendum held in the town in which the land in question is 
located.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Development Rights Purchases
Sargent (1976) has evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of 
various agricultural land preservation tools in relation to eight cri­
teria. His conclusions concerning development rights purchases are 
likely to apply to the Alaska situation. These eight criteria are 
(1 ) landowner compensation, (2 ) relative permanence, (3) penalization 
of landowner, (4) coverage of all agricultural land, (5) public costs,
(6) private costs, (7) special suitability, and (8) general acceptability.
The strengths of development rights purchases are that they compen­
sate landowners, they are relatively permanent, they do not penalize the 
landowner, and they involve no private costs. The greatest strength of 
this tool is that it compensates a landowner for Toss of opportunity, 
i.e., the opportunity to sell farmland for development at a price above
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the agricultural value of the land. This removes the major problem 
associated with zoning— taking from a landowner without compensation. 
This characteristic of a buy-back program is likely to be particularly 
attractive to operators desiring to keep the land in agricultural 
production, for either themselves or their families, but who, at the 
same time, want to capture the capital gains of increased land values 
by "cashing out" on their investment. 11
Weighed against these strengths are some weaknesses. These are 
high public costs, the variable suitability of development rights pur­
chases, and the limited acceptability of purchases to voters, taxpayers, 
and farmers. Much of the disadvantage of development rights acquisi­
tions arise from their high costs and only in special situations is it 
likely that taxpayers will agree to the expense involved. Purchases of 
development rights have variable suitability. For example, they may be 
more suitable to metropolitan areas than to rural areas since less 
expensive tools (e.g. agricultural districts) may be just as effective 
in rural locations. In addition, farmers are not particularly enthused, 
at least initially, to the idea of losing their right to develop their 
land. This lack of interest was shown in our survey of Alaska farmers 
discussed in the next section of the report.
^  The degree of enthusiasm among farmers for such an opportunity to 
"cash out" would depend of course on the treatment of these capital 
gains by the I.R.S. and the state income tax provisions. Several 
of the Alaskan farmers we interviewed brought this important point 
to our attention.
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APPLICABILITY OF A DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAM IN ALASKA
Introduction
The objective of this section is to discuss how a development 
rights program could be applied in Alaska and what its costs and benefits 
might be. Before entering into this discussion we will first review the 
results of a development rights survey and comment on the most efficient 
size of agricultural operations which might be considered when carrying 
out a development rights program.
Development Rights Survey in A1aska
During August 1978 a questionnaire was mailed to 263 agricultural 
landowners^2 in the five major agricultural regions in the State. The 
objective of the questionnaire was to determine the interest that farm­
land owners had in selling development rights to their land and how much 
these rights were worth to them. A sample questionnaire is provided in 
Appendix B.
Response
Of the 263 questionnaires mailed, 18 were returned as undeliverable, 
leaving 245 that actually reached their destination. A total of 112 (45%) 
of the delivered questionnaires were returned (See Table 12). The 
response rate differed by region with the Kenai-Kodiak and Copper River
The list of agricultural landowners was supplied by the Agricultural 
Experiment Station in Palmer, Alaska.
12
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QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE BY REGION
TABLE 12
Region
Questionnaires
Delivered
Questionnaires
Returned Percent
Fairbanks 52 24 46
Delta 34 10 29
Copper River 15 10 67
Matanuska-Susitna 106 41 39
Kenai-Kodiak 38 27" 71
TOTALS 245 112 46
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regions having the highest with 71 percent and 67 percent return rates, 
respectively. The Delta region had the lowest return rate with only 29 
percent of the questionnaires returned. The Fairbanks and Matanuska 
regions, which contain the majority of agricultural operations in the 
state, had return rates of 46 percent and 39 percent, respectively. 
Although the overall response rate of 46 percent is quite satisfactory 
for a mailout questionnaire, the data suggest that we may not have 
obtained an adequate sample response to some questions to have high 
confidence in our analysis.
Farm Size of Respondents
There was a wide range of farm sizes reported by the respondents 
(Figure 2). One-half of the 96 respondents who gave farm size statis­
tics reported one of three farm size classes: 10-49 acres, 140-179 acres,
or 260-499 acres. The remaining 48 respondents were distributed rela­
tively uniformly among the other classes. The acreage figures given by 
the respondents included land leased or rented from other private land­
owners or the government in addition to their own land.
The farm size pattern differs somewhat by region. All of the 
respondents who indicated a farm size above 500 acres were in the 
Matanuska-Susitna or Kenai-Kodiak regions. Large acreages of grazing 
land are leased from the government on Kodiak Island. Most of the 
respondents from the Fairbanks and Copper River areas reported farm 
sizes below 180 acres. A high proportion of the respondents from the 
Kenai Peninsula reported farm sizes of between 10 and 49 acres and
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F - Fairbanks 
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Fariu Size Class (Acres)
140-179 acres. Matanuska-Susitna respondents reported farm sizes in 
every farm size class; however, over 50 percent of the reported farms 
were between 220 and 999 acres.
Interest in Selling Development Rights
Questionnaire recipients were asked to indicate the degree of 
interest they had in selling the development rights to their cleared 
and uncleared land. A brief explanation of the development rights 
concept was given in the cover letter to the questionnaire (Appendix B). 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were highly, moderately, 
slightly, or not interested in selling development rights. Approxi­
mately 94 percent, 106 of the 112 respondents, answered this question. 
Practically all respondents rated cleared and uncleared land similarly.
The distribution of these expressions of interest can be seen in Figure 3.
Most of the respondents in all regions except the Matanuska-Susitna 
area expressed little or no interest in selling development rights. Those 
respondents living in the Matanuska-Susitna region were evenly divided 
on the question. Half indicated little or no interest and half expressed 
moderate to high interest. On a statewide basis, 65 percent expressed 
little or no interest and 35 percent indicated moderate to high interest. 
Over half of all those moderately or highly interested in selling devel­
opment rights were from the Matanuska-Susitna region.
Market Values of Cleared and Uncleared Agricultural Lands
Sixty-nine of the 112 respondents indicated what they perceived 
as the market value of their cleared land and 62 answered the same
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FIGURE 3.
DEGREE OF INTEREST* IN SELLING DEVELOPMENT 
RIGHTS TO AGRICULTURAL LAND
DELTA
I 0
I 2
COPPER 
RIVER BASIN
No. of Respondents
KENAI KODIAK
FAIRBANKS MATANUSKA - SUSITNA
12
i 10 , 1 2 ,  14
No. of Respondents
STATEWIDE
N 1 . 54 I 51%
S . 1.5 " . 1 14%
M 16 1 15% .
H - 71- . 1 20%
No. of Respondents ~ : '■■■, 50%
*N - No Interest 
S - Slight Interest
M - Moderate Interest 
H - High Interest
question about uncleared land. The distributions of these values are 
shown in Figure 4.
On a statewide basis, most of the respondents perceived the 
market values of both uncleared and cleared land to be less than 
$5,000 per acre. Uncleared land was valued at less than $5,Q00/acre 
by 77 percent of the respondents and less than $3,000/acre by 65 
percent of the respondents. The percentages were similar for cleared 
land with 77 percent valuing their land at less than $5,000/acre while 
56 percent indicated a value of less than $3,000/acre.
Average market values for cleared and uncleared land as perceived 
by the respondents were calculated for each region. These data are 
summarized in Table 13. Average values for cleared land ranged from 
$1,500/ acre in Delta to $3,900/acre in the Fairbanks region. Three of 
the regions (Fairbanks, Matanuska-Susitna, Kenai-Kodiak) represented 
by nearly 80 percent of the respondents differed by only $200/acre in 
the perceived average value of cleared land with values ranging between 
$3,700 and $3,900 per acre. The weighted average cleared land value for 
the five regions was $3,300/acre.
Uncleared land values averaged slightly lower than cleared land 
values ranging from $900/acre in the Copper River region to $3,600/acre 
in the Matanuska-Susitna region. As with cleared land, the same three 
regions representing nearly 80 percent of the respondents showed a 
relatively narrow range of perceived land values. Average land values 
for uncleared land in these regions ranged between $2,900 and $3,600 per 
acre. The weighted average for all regions was $2,800/acre.
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TABLE 13
Region
Cleared Land 
Value
Number of 
Respondents
Uncleared Land 
Value
Number of 
Respondents
Fairbanks $3,900 13 $2,900 11
Delta 1,500 9 1,300 8
Copper River 1,900 6 900 6
Matanuska-Susi tna 3,800 28 3,600 24
Kenai-Kodiak 3,700 13 3,100 13
TOTALS 69 62
Weighted Average $3,300 $2,800
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The difference between cleared and uncleared land average values 
per acre was smallest in the Matanuska-Susitna region ($3,800 vs. $3,600) 
and greatest in the Fairbanks region ($3,900 vs. $2,900).
Value of Development Rights
A value for development rights was reported by 39 of the 112 respon­
dents (35%). Thirty-four of these responses were from the Fairbanks, 
Matanuska-Susitna, and Kenai-Kodiak areas. Nearly 70 percent of the 
respondents valued their development rights at less than $4,000/acre.
The distribution of development rights values can be seen in Figure 5.
Average development rights values as perceived by the respondents 
were calculated for the Fairbanks, Matanuska-Susitna and Kenai-Kodiak 
regions. These values are shown in Table 14. Average values were not 
calculated for the Copper River and the Delta regions because so few 
of the respondents in these areas responded to this part of the ques­
tionnaire. Average development rights values in the three areas men­
tioned ranged between $3,100/acre and $3,600/acre. Values were highest 
in the Matanuska-Susitna region. The development value data lacks 
reliablity because of the small sample. In addition, comments and 
figures from some of the questionnaires indicated that some of the 
respondents apparently did not understand how to evaluate the value of 
development rights to their farmland.
Average development rights values were also calculated by degree of 
interest, again using the data from the Fairbanks, Matanuska-Susitna 
and Kenai-Kodiak regions. Calculations showed that those with a moder­
ate or high interest in a development rights program on the average
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TABLE 14
AVERAGE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS VALUES 
(Dollars per Acre)
Region Value No. of Respondents
Fairbanks $3,200 5
Matanuska-Susi tna 3,600 21
Kenai-Kodiak 3,100 g i l l
TOTAL 34
Weighted Average $3,400
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valued these rights at $2,145/acre. Those not interested in the program 
put a much higher value on these rights, $4,662/acre. Respondents in 
the moderate to high interest categories accounted for 63 percent of the 
total acreage represented in the survey responses.
Distance from a Population Center, Interest in Selling Development Rights, 
and Perceived Value of Development Rights
Additional analysis of the survey data was undertaken to determine
whether or not a landowner's interest in a development rights purchase
program and/or his perceived value of these rights were related to the
distance between his farm and the nearest population center. Table 15
presents a summary, in percentage terms, of the data relating to the
interest/distance question. One can observe that the distributions of
responses are similar between the moderate or high and low or no interest<
categories and are, therefore, similar to the pattern shown for all 
l ^responses. This close relationship suggests that farmers' interest 
in selling development rights is not significantly influenced by the 
location of his farm relative to a population center. When data for 
just those farm owners living near Palmer and Wasilla were broken out 
and analyzed in the same way the identical conclusion was drawn.
We also addressed 1;he issue of whether a landowner's perception 
of the value of the development rights to his property was influenced 
by the location of the farm relative to a population center.
13 Using the chi square test for independence with the data on which 
Table 15 is based, we were not able to reject the hypothesis of 
independence of interest and distance at any reasonable level of 
significance. One must recognize, however, that these data were 
not obtained through random sampling. Thus, our conclusions must 
be viewed with caution.
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TABLE 15
FARM DISTANCE FROM NEAREST COMMUNITY 
RELATED TO DEGREE OF INTEREST9
Distance Categories
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21 +
Percent of Farmers Reporting 41 24 16 7 12
Percent of Farmers with 
, Moderate or High Interest 39 29 12 5 15
Percent of Farmers with 
Little or No Interest 43 21 19 9 9
a Based on 111 farmers reporting.
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The expectation here was that the closer the farm was to a town or 
city, the more attractive would be that land for development purposes 
and that this relative attractiveness would be reflected in the perceived 
value of the development rights. Unfortunately the quality of the data 
obtained through the survey did not allow a rigorous test of this pro­
position on either a local or statewide basis. The data in Table 16 is 
presented to show the nature of the relationship or lack thereof between 
distance and development rights value as perceived by farmers near Palmer. 
No clear pattern emerges but, again, this conclusion must be qualified 
by recognizing that the data are not taken from a random sample. The 
fact that the expected relationship did not occur may perhaps also be 
explained by the existence of unrealistic expectations on the part of 
some land owners regarding the development value of their property.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that these perceived values 
represent the mimimum payments that these land owners might be willing 
to accept to forego their development options.
Economic Size Agricultural Operations 
A key factor in the attempts to maintain and/or expand agricultural 
production in the State is the development of economic size agricultural 
operations. Thomas (1976, p. 15) noted that one of the major problems 
with agriculture in the Matanuska Valley was the small size of individual 
farms. The Alaska Power Administration (1970, pp. 46-53) has determined 
the most economically efficient sizes for dairy, small grain and potato 
operations. Each of these enterprises is discussed below.
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TABLE 16
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
VALUE AND DISTANCE FROM PALMER
Distance
(Miles)
Stated Values
0-1 $10,000
7,700
3,000
2 10,000
3.500
1.500
3 3.500 
1,000
5.500
4 2,000
5 600
6
7 3,000
8 500
9
10 850
ff 1,000
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Dairy operations in the Matanuska Valley wquld have to approach 
60 cows to be considered an economic unit. Such a unit would require 
280 acres to grow the necessary feed. A 60 cow dairy is estimated to 
be a minimum economic size and is probably just above being marginal.
A more realistic size would be a 120 cow enterprise based on 560 acres. 
A budget analysis of this larger enterprise showed a return on invest­
ment of 8.8 percent after allowing for the operator's salary and the 
value of perquisites.
There is some concern that if the number of dairy cows in the 
Matanuska Valley declines further, the creamery that processes the milk 
will go out of business. We were unable to verify this. Husby (1978) 
has indicated that approximately 750 cows are needed to support a 
creamery, thus, baring other problems, the present milk cow herd of 
1,500 animals would have to decline by almost one-half for the creamery 
to discontinue operation, assuming that Alaska dairy enterprises are 
the only source of supply. The present creamery, however* is importing 
milk for processing from Washington State. If the Alaskan supply of 
milk declines it may be possible to import a greater proportion of non- 
Alaskan milk to maintain operations.
The 1970 study by the Alaska Power Administration determined that 
for small grain farms the minimum economic unit was 320 acres. Thomas, 
et al. (1977) in evaluating potential barley production in the Delta- 
Clearwater, consider this to be too small under current agricultural 
conditions and suggest that 3,000 acres would be the minimum economic 
unit for a grain farm.
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A potato farm of about 40 acres was identified as the minimum Sized 
unit that could support a farmer and his family. Potato farms require 
less investment than either grain or dairy farms. Labor requirements 
are more than for grain farms but less than for dairy farms.
The Alaska Power Administration Study did not consider vegetable 
farms other than potatoes. Interviews with vegetable farmers in the 
Matanuska Valley indicated that a minimum economic unit would be about 
15 acres.
Potential Costs of a Purchase of Development Rights Program 
An important consideration in examining the applicability of a 
purchase of development rights program for Alaska is the potential costs 
of such a program. These costs would vary widely depending on the scope 
of the program. Estimated purchase costs (the value of development rights) 
for several alternative purchase programs are provided in this section. 
Estimated development rights values are derived from two sources: the
survey of Alaskan farmers that was described earlier and, for the 
Matanuska-Susitna Valleys, from Alaska's program of usfe-value assessment 
of agricultural land.
Estimates of purchase costs for three alternative acquisition pro­
grams are provided in Table 17. These estimates are for (1) the cost 
of purchasing development rights to all acres in Alaska planted to crops 
in 1977, (2) the cost of purchases by specific region in the state 
and (3) the cost of purchases in the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys by level 
of interest among farmers. Following a short discussion of these esti-
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TABLE 17
ESTIMATED PURCHASE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PURCHASE PROGRAMS
Scope of Purchase Acres Available9
Cost (per acre) 
From Farmer Survey Total Cost
Cost (per acre)b 
From Use-value Assessment Total Cost
1. State-wide 19,005 $3,400 $64,617,000 --
c2. By region
a. Tanana Valley 5,633 3,200d 18,025,600 -
b. Matanuska-Susitna Valleys 11,222 3,600 40,399,200 $747 $8,382,834
c. Kenai Peninsula 2,050 3,100 6,355,000 §Pil
3. By interest
(Matanuska-Susitna Val1eys)e
a. High & moderate interest 7,070 2,145 15,165,150 747 5,281,290
b. Low & no interest 4,152 4,662 19,356,624 747 3,101,544
a Acres planted to crops in 1977 (ACLRS, 1978, p. 16).
k This value is from Janet McCabe, The Urban Fringe: Methods of Land Use Direction, Federal-State Land Use Planning
Commission for Alaska, Study No. 35, 1978.
c One hundred acres in Southwest Alaska are excluded.
^ Values provided by Fairbanks area farmers were applied to all of the Tanana Valley.
e Total available acres for this alternative were determined by multiplying the total acres in the Matanuska-Susitna
Valleys by the percent of acres in high-moderate and low-no interest categories as taken,from returned questionnaires. 
Sixty-three percent of reported acres were in the high-moderate category while 37 percent were in the low-no category.
mates, an examination of the potential costs of purchasing the develop­
ment rights to a specific agricultural enterprise in the Matanuska Valley 
is provided.
If the development rights to all acres planted to crops in 1977 
(ACLRS, 1978, p. 16) were purchased, the estimated total purchase cost, 
using the average state-wide value of $3,400 per acre for development 
rights as determined by farmer survey, would be approximately $64,600,000. 
Approximately $40,400,000 (63%) of this total would apply to Matansuka- 
Susitna Valleys. In the Tanana Valley, the estimated cost would be 
$18,000,000. For the Kenai Peninsula, estimated cost would be approxi­
mately $6,000,000.
Y  An alternative purchase cost estimate for the Matanuska-Susitna 
Valleys is approximately $8,400,000. This estimate was calculated by 
using the base for deferred taxes under Alaska's use-value assessment 
program as the development rights value. If current records of agri­
cultural value and market value of agricultural lands were kept, then 
the difference between these two figures could be viewed as the devel­
opment rights value. However, it appears that development rights 
values and thus probable purchase costs may be greatly underestimated 
using this procedure. This is not unexpected since farmland market 
values are typically undervalued by assessors in the United States.
This often happens because assessing departments are not able to do 
yearly assessments because of staff and budget limitations.
Because the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys are presently the most 
important agricultural area in Alaska, and also because this region is
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facing the most intense development pressure, we show two additional 
cost estimates. These estimates are by level of interest among farmers 
and by type of operation.
For the Matanuska-Susitna Valleys, an estimate of the costs of 
purchasing development rights by level of interest among farmers is 
also provided in Table 17. In this estimate, the available acres with 
high-moderate interest and low-no interest were determined by extra­
polation from the acres reported by farmers responding to our survey to 
the total acres available (11,222). Because we were unable to obtain a 
random sample of farmers» there is likely to be considerable error in 
our estimate of acres within high-moderate and low-no interest categories. 
If a random sample of farmers were obtained, more confidence could be 
placed in these estimates.
Agricultural enterprises that currently exist in the Matanuska- 
Susitna Valleys include dairying, potato-vegetables, hay and silage, and j 
a small amount of beef and swine production. For various reasons there 
may be greater rationale for purchasing the development rights to those 
acres needed to maintain dairying for any other single type of enter­
prise in this area. For potato-vegetable enterprises, for example, 
farmers surveyed expressed little interest in participation in a 
development rights purchase program. Also, because these crops are 
land intensive, the current amount of land available does not appear 
to be a critical factor. Next, for hay and silage enterprises, few 
people are involved in full-time operations and production units are 
not easily identifiable. Those acres involved in forage production
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that would be critical for the maintenance of dairying are covered in 
the following dairy discussion. Finally, beef and swine production is 
a minor part of the agricultural econon\y in this region and accounts 
for only a small amount of land use.
As of January 1, 1978, there were 13 Grade A dairy herds in Alaska 
(ACLRS, 1978, p. 34). Eleven of these herds were located in the Matanuska 
Valley. Herds in the state were estimated to total 1,500 dairy cows,
1,400 of which were in the Matanuska Valley. This is the lowest number 
of dairy cows in the state since 1960. The high year was 1962 when 
3,200 dairy cows in 35 Grade A herds were located in Alaska.
Because of the decrease in dairies and cows in Alaska, interest has 
befn expressed at maintaining dairy operations at least at their current 
levels. Because most of the dairying activity is in the Palmer area, 
a way to possibly insure the maintenance of the dairy industry would be 
to purchase the development rights to the acres needed to support the 
current number of cows in this area. It has been estimated that for 
operations larger than 120 cows, approximately 4.67 acres are needed 
to support a cow annually (Alaska Power Administration, 1978, p. 48).
Thus, approximately 6,538 acres would be necessary to sustain the dairy 
industry at its current level in the Matanuska Valley.
Three estimates of the cost of acquiring the development rights 
to this number of acres are provided in Table 18. These estimates of 
development rights values are: (1) the average development rights value
of the four dairymen in the Matanuska Valley who answered our question­
naire and showed some interest in selling these rights; (2) the average 
value of all respondents in the Matanuska Valley, and (3) the average
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development rights value of all respondents in the Matanuska-Susitna 
area who showed high or moderate interest in selling their development 
rights.
TABLE 18
ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PURCHASES TO MAINTAIN 
THE MATANUSKA DAIRY INDUSTRY
Acres Needed Total Cost 
Four Dairymen9
Total Cost 
All Respondents 
Matanuska Valleyb
Total Cost 
High-moderate Interest 
Matanuska Valley0
6,538 $24,700,000 $23,500,000 $14,000,000
a $3,775/acre. 
b $3,600/acre. 
c $2,145/acre.
Other Costs
Besides the direct purchase costs associated with development rights 
acquisition, other costs would be a part of such a program. Two of 
these potential costs, easily identifiable but not so easily quantifiable, 
are administrative and legal costs and property tax losses.
Administrative and legal costs would arise from (1) activities 
involved with the actual purchases and (2) from continuing administra­
tion once land was in an acquisition program. In the initial purchase 
effort, costs would be associated with such activities as contacting 
farmers, identifying and describing parcels included in any program, 
preparing legal documents, negotiating sales with farmers, closing sales,
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etc. Once land was actually in a program, continuing administration of 
the program would be needed. This would entail making sure contracts 
and regulations were followed. For example, someone would have to make 
certain that any building that took place on land under an acquisition 
program was in accordance with the program's regulations.
Our literature search of existing programs failed to disclose any 
documentation of the above costs. However, assuming that once the pro­
gram was underway, two full-time professionals and a secretary were 
adequate to administer the program, a gross estimate of administrative 
costs might be as follows:
Estimated Annual Administrative Costs*
Salaries
Program leader $35,000
Assistant 22,000
Secretarial 16,000
Travel 5,000
Supplies 2,000
Total $80,000
*(It is assumed that legal advice would come from 
attorneys already employed by the state. New 
legal costs would then be slight if these attorneys 
were able to assume this increased work load with­
out seriously detracting from their current assign­
ments .)
Another possible cost to local governments would be a reduction in 
property tax revenues due to the decrease in land values following the 
sale of development rights. Currently, under Alaska's agricultural land 
use-value assessment law, property taxes that are lost by a borough when
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farmland is placed under the use-value assessment program are reimbursed 
by the state. However, the market value of land under a development rights 
acquisition program would be the land's use-value, and boroughs would not 
be entitled to reimbursement for losses in property taxes, since none 
would occur. Although borough governments would lose property tax revenues 
under a development rights purchase program, there would be a corresponding 
reduction in costs to the state government, assuming all land involved 
was previously enrolled in the use-value assessment program.
Benefits of Development Rights Acquisition 
Earlier in this report it was suggested that the preservation of 
agricultural activities has associated with it a set of joint benefits 
(see section on market failure). In assessing the feasibility of a 
public program to maintain land in agriculture in Alaska it is, of 
course, important to consider these benefits in relationship to the 
costs of achieving this end. Some of the benefits attributable to the 
presence of agricultural activities, however, do not lend themselves to 
objective quantification. They are public goods. As is the case with 
any good, a person's subjective evaluation of the relative importance of 
this class of benefits depends on his own personal value system. But 
unlike conventional private goods, the absence of.an organized system of 
exchange for these collective goods stands in the way of our use of 
market signals (prices) to measure society's willingness to pay for 
these benefits.^
^ S i m i l a r  problems have been encountered in other public policy issues 
in Alaska such as the proposed relocation of the state capital and 
the debate involving the use of the North Slope haul road.
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An alternative approach to actual quantification is to present to 
the public and to government officials in the state a listing and dis­
cussion of the potential benefits stemming from a development rights 
purchase program. This information, along with the program costs esti­
mates, may then be employed by the decision maker in assessing the 
overall desirability of a given policy. Specifically, the program costs 
estimates represent the minimum value that must be achieved by the joint 
benefits in order for the program to be economically feasible.
Maintenance of the Local Agricultural Economy
From a state-wide perspective, agriculture currently contributes 
relatively little monetarily to the Alaska economy. Statewide, agri­
cultural activities accounted for an estimated two percent of the Gross 
State Product prior to start-up of petroleum production from the Prudhoe 
Bay field (Logsdon, 1975). Comparable statistics for local areas within 
the state are not available. The degree of dependence of the Palmer- 
Wasilla area, for example, on the agricultural industry has not been 
documented. One can easily observe, however, that the relative position 
of agriculture in this area is of much greater significance.
In measuring the "local agricultural economy" benefits associated 
with a development rights buy-back program, one must look beyond the 
agricultural landholders themselves. These farmers and ranchers, in 
deciding whether to continue their agricultural operations or to develop 
their land,1^ presumably consider only the implications for their own
15 "Develop their land," as used here, includes the sale of the land to 
others who in turn develop the land.
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private welfare. In the absence of any public program that might 
prevent the conversion of agricultural lands to other uses, one would 
expect these individuals to remain in agriculture only if the private 
gains of doing so were greater than the returns from converting the land 
to an alternative use. Thus, if one observes agricultural land being 
developed in an area, one must conclude that the landholders who sell or 
subdivide their land are better off economically without than with 
agriculture.16 What is not taken into account in the decisions of these 
landholders is the effect their actions might have on the welfare of 
other individuals— processors, farm suppliers, etc.— whose business 
activities are somehow linked to the production of agricultural commo­
dities on these lands.
What do these businesses that represent the infrastructure for the 
agriculture industry stand to lose if land is converted to nonagricul­
tural uses? Clearly it is the difference between their net earnings in 
the presence of agricultural production and what they could earn in 
their next best alternative. The net effect on these businesses, then, 
depends largely on how specialized they are, or, stated differently, on 
the mobility of the resources that they employ. It is conceivable that
Since participation in the development rights purchase program as 
it is envisioned would be voluntary, one would expect farmers or 
ranchers to forfeit their development options only if they receive 
compensation at least equal to the discounted value of future develop­
ment benefits. While the initial asking price for development rights 
could very likely exceed this minimum value, one might reason that 
bargaining between the state and the landholder concerning development 
rights values would generate an "equilibrium" price at which the 
landholder was indifferent between selling and retaining these rights. 
If this were the case, landowners who participate in the program will, 
upon the establishing of this theoretical limiting price, be just as 
well off with the program as in its absence.
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some firms such as financial institutions would be better off after the 
conversion of land to nonagricultural uses. The only people who would 
clearly be made worse off by the conversion of agricultural land would 
be some immobile farm workers whose absence of skills outside the agri­
cultural industry would prevent them from easily adjusting to the changing 
economic scene (Gardner, 1977).^  Regarding this latter class of resources, 
one must face the issue of whether retaining land in agriculture is the 
least cost method of providing these individuals with their present 
standard of living. It may well be that publically financed programs of 
direct economic assistance and/or retraining could achieve this end more 
efficiently.
Locally Produced Food
As pointed out before, food is a private good produced in a compe­
titive environment and as such there is little evidence that the market 
will allocate a nonoptimal amount of land to food production. In Alaska, 
however, one often hears the argument that we are too dependent on out- 
of-state sources for our food supply. It is further argued that by 
promoting a local agricultural industry we can lower our food costs.
What is the relationship of a development rights buy-back program to 
these issues? Can the preservation of currently and potentially produc­
tive private agricultural land reduce our dependence on outside food 
sources and lower our food costs? To address these issues one might
^  Although these individuals would surely be worse off, this is not 
to say that no others would suffer. Other individuals might also 
be faced with resource immdbility.
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first ask what are the benefits to be gained by reducing our food imports? 
It would seem that only if there were some cost advantages would it be 
in the interest of Alaskan consumers to buy their food from local 
s o u r c e s .1 8 jhe important question then centers around the ability of 
Alaska farmers and ranchers to compete successfully with other agricul­
tural producers in providing food supplies to Alaska consumers. Alaskan 
agricultural firms are small relative to their competitors, and therein 
lies an important part of the explanation of why production costs are 
higher in Alaska, even in the presence of any environmental advantages 
that are related to long daylight periods and the relative freedom from 
insects that damage crops.
While the agricultural land mass in private ownership could support 
a, larger number of efficient-sized intensive agricultural enterprises 
(e.g. vegetable farms), the market for products from these firms is 
currently limited to in-state sales due to the absence of processing 
facilities. A relatively small acreage planted to garden vegetables 
could supply the entire state's population with fresh produce. But 
larger acreages would be needed to support an infrastructure and to 
provide Alaska consumers with an opportunity to benefit from the poten­
tially lower prices associated with large scale production. In the
1 8 .
It is sometimes suggested that by reducing our food imports, we may 
become less vulnerable to disruptions in food delivery systems linking 
Alaska with current food sources. It is difficult to evaluate this 
alleged benefit of local food production on any objective basis.
One's view on this issue depends on his perception of the reliability 
of food transport systems and on how much he is willing to pay in 
order to insure that a disruption in this system will not affect 
the availability of food in the state.
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absence of product export opportunities that might be made possible if 
processing facilities were available, there is little incentive to bring 
a critical mass of vegetable farms into production.
Open Space and Other Public Good Amenities
Open space is only one of several "external benefits" that accrue 
to Alaskans from the decision by agricultural landowners to keep their 
land either uncleared or in agricultural use. Other benefits in this 
class are the maintenance of wildlife habitat, watershed protection, and 
the preservation of a visible, perhaps romantic, "lifestyle." Since 
farmers and ranchers are not in a position to capture the full value of 
these benefits, they have Tittle incentive to provide a socially optimal 
quantity of environmental amenities. The market system will often fail 
to efficiently allocate resources in situations such as this where 
property rights to certain benefits are undefined.^
While Alaska, with its vast area, has a great deal of open space 
and related environmental amenities to offer its residents, understandably 
the highest value is placed on these benefits in situations where they 
are in short supply. In areas around Anchorage and Fairbanks where 
population and industrialization have expanded recently, these benefits 
take on high value indeed. It is in these relatively densely populated 
areas that the preservation of open space promises to have significant
Since this class of benefits are public goods in addition to being 
externalities, we are faced with a further problem on the supply 
side as discussed earlier (see page 4). Specifically, even if a 
beneficiary could be forced to pay for the good, it would be ineffi­
cient to levy a charge since the marginal cost of extending a 
collective good to an additional consumer is zero.
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social value. Since these benefits accrue chiefly to urban residents, 
an equitable program for preserving these opportunities would presumably 
also have the urban residents paying the bulk of the costs associated 
with their preservation.
Removal of Uncertainty
A final potential benefit to be mentioned in association with a 
development rights purchase program is the effect that such a program 
could have on investment decisions by farmers and ranchers. An impor­
tant reason for the inefficiency of agricultural production at the urban 
fringes around Anchorage and Fairbanks is the great amount of uncertainty 
these farmers associate with the likelihood of land use shifts. Farmers 
have little incentive to invest optimally, especially in durable capital, 
if the probability is high that they will soon choose to abandon farming 
and thus forego the opportunity to capture the returns on agricultural 
investments (Gardner, 1975). As a result, farmers earn smaller net 
returns in their enterprises than they would if they invested in more 
efficient operations. A development rights buy-back program would serve 
to remove this uncertainty by compensating farmers to forfeit the devel­
opment option in return for keeping land in agriculture for a period 
sufficiently long to capture the benefits from long term investment.
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OTHER AGRICULTURAL LAND CONTROL TOOLS
The purchase of development rights is only one of the tools used in 
the United States in an attempt to keep land in agriculture. Other land 
control techniques in current use include use-value assessment of farm­
land, zoning, and agricultural districts. Although not currently used, 
zoning by eminent domain and transfer of development rights are new 
concepts in agricultural land control that may see application in the 
future. (More information about the specifics of agricultural land 
control techniques other than purchase of development rights is provided 
in Appendix D).
The State of Alaska has attempted to protect agricultural land 
through legislation designed to classify and dispose of agricultural 
land for agricultural purposes only. The Agricultural Land Classification 
Law calls for the classification of approximately 650,000 acres of 
Class II or Class III land for agricultural purposes. By April, 1978, 
about 165,000 acres of state land had been classified as agricultural.
The Agricultural Land Disposal Law provides for the conveyance or lease 
of agricultural interests only on state lands classified for agriculture. 
Under this law there is a provision for the conveyance of the remaining 
interests if it is in the public interest.
In another program, Alaska is using use-value assessment of farmland 
as a method of improving the economic viability of agriculture. Under 
this program, owners of farmland who receive more than ten percent of 
their annual gross income from farming can apply to have their farm 
property assessed at its use-value in agriculture rather than at market
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value. This is known as use-value assessment and the tax obligation 
from this assessment is less than from assessment at market value. If, 
however, the property is converted to nonfarm use, the owner must pay 
a penalty tax equal to the difference between the current tax bill when 
assessed at use-value and what would have been the tax bill had the
property been taxed at market value, this tax bill is due not only for
the year of conversion but also for up to the preceding six years. An 
eight percent interest charge is included for each of the years for 
which the penalty tax is calculated.
At the local level, the Matanuska-Susitna Borough has been debating
an ordinance involving the acquisition of development rights from agri­
cultural land and the payment for these rights in land in lieu of money 
(Matanuska-Susitna Borough, Ordinance No. 78-48 [Draft]). If passed, 
this ordinance would allow the Borough to trade Borough land to farmland 
owners in exchange for the development rights to agricultural land that 
is under development pressure.
With several tools available in addition to the purchase of devel­
opment rights, what techniques should be employed if citizens of a state 
conclude that extra-market techniques to keep land in agriculture are 
desirable? Because all land control tools ha\/e limited applicability 
and effectiveness when evaluated using specific criteria,.they should 
not be viewed as mutally exclusive; that is, the use of one does not 
exclude the use of another. Part of the decision as to which tool(s) 
would be most effective depends on the goals of a land control program, 
•for example, if the goal is to keep land permanently in agriculture, one 
technique or set of techniques may be best. If, however, the goal is to
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allow for more orderly development, other tools may be more suitable. 
Also, the acceptability to various interest groups of one technique 
versus another is an important consideration. With all tools, the 
costs associated with their use should be weighed carefully against the 
probable benefits of their use.^
Comparison of Agricultural Land Preservation Tools 
A comparison of alternative agricultural land preservation tools 
is provided in Table 19. Each tool is evaluated using seven criteria.
It should be noted that the evaluations of each technique involve some 
degree of subjective analysis by the developers (Gray, 1975; Sargent, 
1976) of the table. This is especially true in the case of columns two, 
four, and seven. All tools were evaluated using the developers' judg­
ments of their performance across the United States. However, it should 
be remembered that what might be true as the general evaluation of a 
specific technique with respect to a certain criterion for the United 
States as a whole may not be true in a specific location. For example, 
although purchase of development rights may have limited acceptability 
in most parts of the United States, in a specific location, e.g., Suffolk 
County, it may be very acceptable.
Fitch and Stoevener (1977, p. 35) have suggested six criteria by which 
alternative land control devices may be evaluated. These are:
"(1) effectiveness in achieving planned objectives, (2) effects on 
the distribution of associated benefits and costs, (3) the costs 
required for organization and administration, (4) the degree of 
directness or indirectness, (5) political and legal acceptability, 
and (6) effects on the provision of (other) public services." Some 
of these criteria are discussed in detail in their paper.
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TABLE 19
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND PRESERVATION TOOLS
Tool
Compensates
Landowner
(1)
Relati ve 
Permanence 
(2)
Penalizes
Landowners
(3)
Covers all 
Agricultural 
Land (4)
Publi c 
Costs 
(5)
Private
Costs
(6)
General
Acceptability
(7)
1. Purchase of Development 
Rights
yes yes no no high none limited
2. Public Purchase yes yes no no high none very limited
3. Zoning no no yes possible low loss of 
opportuni ty
1imi ted
4. Use-value Assessment
a. preferential assessment
b. deferred tax
c. restrictive agreement
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
low
low
low
none
penalties
penalties
limited
limited
limited
5. Agricultural Districts no yes yes possible low loss of 
opportunity
good
6. Zoning by Eminent Domain yes yes no possible low3 low not tested
7. Transfer of Development 
Rights
yes yes no possible low low , i not tested
8. Selling only Agricultural 
Ri ghts
N.A. yes no no low low limited
9. Payment for Development 
Rights with Land
yes yes no no high low not tested
a Only if gainers are taxed to compensate losers.
SOURCES: Gray, William H. Methods of Agricultural Land Preservation. Washington Cooperative Extension Service E.M.
3906, Washington State University, February 1975; and Sargent, Fredric 0. Keeping Land in Agriculture. 
Vermont Agricultural Experiment Station MS#88, University of Vermont, December 1976.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The conversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses is progressing 
at a fast pace in Alaska as in other parts of the country. The purpose 
of this study was to examine the feasibility of the use of public 
purchase of development rights from agricultural landowners in the state 
as a means of slowing this trend. The framework for analysis called for 
an assessment of the potential benefits and costs of such a public 
policy designed to stall the market forces that are leading to these 
shifts in rural land use patterns.
Initially, the inquiry dealt with the question of why the patterns 
of resource use generated by the land market might be socially undesi­
rable. The principal determination here was that some of the benefits 
that flow from the existence of agricultural land use are not captured 
by the farm or ranch operators. Rather they are external benefits which 
accrue to persons outside the agricultural sector and as such are not 
considered by the landowner in his decisions regarding land use. Since 
some of these benefits, such as open space and other environmental 
amenities, are also collective goods, a voluntary exchange market system 
provides no adequate mechanism by which those desiring these goods may 
register their preferences with the landowners. Thus, there may be a 
justification for social action to correct this market failure.
While conversion of agricultural land to residential and industrial 
uses is widespread in Alaska, the greatest shifts in land use patterns 
are taking place within commuting distance of the more densely populated 
areas around Fairbanks and Anchorage. This pattern is particularly
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noticeable in the Matanuska Valley near the communities of Palmer and 
Wasilla. Understandably then, the greatest support for a public program 
to preserve these agricultural lands exists iti this region. This 
support is reflected in a resolution, under consideration by the Matanuska- 
Susitna Borough Assembly, to compensate current fanners with land grants 
to forego the development of their lands.
Our examination of present and potential agricultural development 
in the state revealed that the economic contribution of the agricultural 
industry to the Alaska economy is currently quite small. In the local 
area of the Matanuska Valley, however, agriculture continues to repre­
sent a more significant portion of the economic base. Further, it was 
determined that a significant amount of potentially productive agricul­
tural land exists in this area. Much of this land is held by the state 
and borough governments. The public sector, then, is in a position to 
determine future use of these lands through its land disposal programs. 
Recent sales in which only the agricultural rights were conveyed to the 
private sector illustrate the influence that government may have on land, 
use patterns. These findings also suggest that the future of agriculture 
in the Matanuska Valley (as well as other parts of the state), and, 
hence, the availability of the other amenity values associated with this 
industry, may not depend on the lands currently in production. At 
issue, of course, is whether the least cost method of achieving the 
social benefits produced by an agricultural industry is to maintain the 
land currently in production or to use state and local government land 
disposal policy to achieve this end.
A review of development rights purchase programs in other parts of 
the country was instructive, although experiences with this public 
policy tool are too few and relatively untested for one to adequately 
evaluate their success. The one fact that stands out, however, is that 
the purchase of development rights on agricultural lands is a very 
expensive undertaking. Unlike the Alaska situation, the acquisition 
programs initiated elsewhere are aimed at preserving agricultural 
economies that are currently quite viable. Another important charac­
teristic of these programs is that they are being used in areas where 
there are few opportunities for expansion of the existing agricultural 
activity.
A condition necessary for the success of a development rights 
purchase program is that it be acceptable to agricultural landholders.
Our survey of farmers and ranchers in the state showed only a small 
amount of interest among these individuals on a state-wide level. Most 
of the interest expressed was concentrated among those landholders in 
the Matanuska and Susitna Valleys. The survey results also provided 
information regarding the potential purchase price of development rights. 
This information again showed a development rights purchase program to 
be a costly proposition.
Information regarding the size of agricultural firms in Alaska 
shows that in many cases the scale of operation is inadequate to take 
advantage of size economies. One thing that a development rights buy­
back program might accomplish would be to allow the expansion of indi­
vidual operations through the availability of lower priced agricultural 
land. Related to this, the buy-back method might be useful for acquiring
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the development rights to existing non-agricultural "inholdings" within 
areas of agricultural activity in the state. The acquisition of develop­
ment rights to these isolated inholdings couTd reduce the risk of having 
a land use develop which was incompatible with agriculture. At the same 
time, the use of the program "in this context could facilitate the appli­
cation of large-scale agricultural operations in farming areas.
Public acquisition of development rights is only one of a number 
of tools available for use in attempting to preserve agricultural lands. 
The main advantages of such a program have to do with the equitable 
treatment of farmland owners and the opportunity provided for long term 
maintenance of agricultural activities. These advantages must be 
balanced, of course, against the high relative cost of this approach.
As stated before, the primary benefit attributable to the preser­
vation of private agricultural land in the state appears to be the open 
* space and related environmental amenity values associated with this
land. This is particularly the case when applied to maintaining certain 
scenic areas around communities or along highways. These benefits, by 
themselves, may justify some extra-market control of the conversion of 
agricultural lands to other uses in some critical areas. In Alaska 
these concerns are naturally most important in the urbanized areas, 
particularly in locations within commuting distance of Anchorage. The 
critical questions here, of course, are how much are Alaskans willing to 
compensate landowners, through the purchase of development rights, to 
forego the option of converting their land, and how are these costs to 
be distributed among the state's residents.
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APPENDIX A
OPERATION OF PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS
Operation of Suffolk County'S Program
Suffolk County's program of farmland development rights purchases 
is founded on two statutes. These two .statutes are Section 247 of New 
York's General Municipal Law and Suffolk County Local Law Number 19 
(Newton, n.d., p. 4). Section 247 gives local government the right to 
acquire full or lesser interest in land used for open space while local 
law Number 19 authorizes the expenditure of county funds for the pur­
chase of development rights on farmland".
The Suffolk County program is administered by the Suffolk County 
Farmlands Development Rights Committee, a permanent county agency 
(Lesher and Eller, 1977, p. 15). The purchase program has worked in the 
following manner. Letters are sent to farmland owners asking for bids 
for the sale of development rights to their land. These bids are evalu­
ated by eight criteria. These criteria are: (1) acreage - tracts,
individually or in groups, should total 200 acres or more; (2) soil - 
Class I and II soils are given priority; (3) price - should be reason­
able; (4) contiguity - individual parcels should be adjacent to open 
farmland; (5) development pressure - parcels with extreme development 
pressures are given priority; (6) buffer zones - land bounded by roads 
or open spaces is preferred; (7) current use - land actively cultivated 
is preferred; and (8) owner - preference is given to active farmers 
(Newton, n.d., p. 7).
Owners of acceptable bids are then asked to sign options and autho­
rize appraisals of their farmland. Appraisals are then conducted to 
determine development rights values. Next, bids are re-evaluated using 
appraisal information, and owners of acceptable bids are asked to accept 
appraised values and to sign contracts. If the owner accepts, the 
county signs a contract with the owner and the development rights are 
transferred to the county. Farm owners retain all other rights, inclu­
ding the right to sell the land. Farmland owners receive the value of 
the development rights in a lump sum. Suffolk County is financing these 
purchases through the sale of 30 year municipal bonds (Newton, n.d., p. 6).
Operation of Maryland's Program1 
Maryland's program is administered by the Maryland Agricultural 
Land Preservation Foundation, each county's governing body, and county 
Agricultural Preservation Boards. Membership on the Foundation is by 
appointment of the governor. Its functions include approval of agricul­
tural districts, purchases of development rights, and adoption of rules 
and regulations to implement the law. County boards advise county 
governments regarding the establishment of agricultural districts and 
the approval of development rights purchases.
The first step in Maryland's preservation program is the formation 
of agricultural districts. The initiation for these districts is by 
petition from farmers to the*county governing body. The petitions are 
evaluated by the Agricultural Preservation Advisory Board and the county
1 The source for this section is William J. Bellows, Maryland Agricultural 
Land Preservation Foundation: A Summary, Maryland Cooperative Extension 
Service Leaflet 88, University of Maryland, 1977.
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planning and zoning agency based on specific criteria. If a petition is 
recommended for approval by either the board or planning and zoning 
agency, a public hearing on the petition is held before the local 
county government. If they approve the recommendation, it goes to the 
Preservation Foundation for final approval. Following the formation of 
districts, counties must permit the following activities: (1) farm use
of land; (2) operation of farm machinery at any time; and (3) any normal 
agricultural operation in accordance with sound husbandry practices 
which does not endanger bodily injury or health.
Once land is included in a district, the landowner must keep the 
land in agriculture for five years. Additionally, the land owner may 
offer to sell development rights to his farmland to the Maryland 
Agriculture Land Preservation Foundation. Sale of these rights pro­
hibit residential subdivision for commercial purposes. After a land­
owner has been in a district for five years, he may terminate his 
inclusion if he has not sold his development rights. One year's notice 
is required to terminate a farmer's participation in a district.
Maryland has a multi-step procedure by which development rights are 
to be purchased. The first step is an application by a landowner to the 
Foundation offering to sell development rights. Included is the land­
owner's asking price. After an application is received by the Foundation, 
the Foundation notifies the appropriate local county governing body.
They in turn notify the County Agricultural Preservation Advisory Board 
of the application. The Advisory Board recommends either approval or 
disapproval to the county government. The county then notifies the 
Foundation as to its recommendation. Finally, the Foundation approves
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or disapproves the application based on two criteria: (1) land must
meet requirements to be included in an agricultural district, and (2) 
priority of approval for purchase is determined by a ranking system 
based on the discount of the asking price below the development rights 
value, as a percentage of the development rights value. The formula for 
determing this value is:
* Ratio = development rights - asking price 
development rights
where, development rights = fair market value - agricultural value
If a farmer sets his asking price equal to the value of the development 
rights, the ratio would be zero. Purchases cannot be made at prices 
above the development rights value. Bids are then ranked as to their 
discount below the full development rights value. The higher the ratio,
the higher the bid is ranked.
The Foundation can approve purchases only to the extent that funds
are available and thus the need for ranking bids. The Foundation will
make purchases through the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Fund. 
This fund is to be financed by general or special fund appropriations 
and by grants or transfers from governmental or private sources. Maryland 
has a complex system to allocate the fund, but basically it will works as 
follows: half the money made available to the fund is to be allocated
equally for purchases in each county; the other half is to be made 
available to counties having..approved matching fund programs. The Fund 
expects to have between $4.5 and $6.5 million annually starting in 1980 
to purchase development rights (Musselrnan, 1978).
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A sale of development rights prohibits residential subdivision for 
commercial purposes. However, the landowner who sold the development 
rights may request to use one acre or less for his and his children's 
residential use. This is permitted only once'for that owner and each 
child. In addition, housing may be permitted for tenants as long as 
construction does not exceed one tenant house per 100 acres. After 25 
years the development rights can be repurchased by the landowner if 
farming is unprofitable and if approval is granted by the Foundation and 
local governing body.
Operation of New Jersey's Program2
Because of the limited amount of funds available for acquisitions, 
and because this is only a demonstration project, purchases will be made 
in only one New Jersey county. Burlington County has been selected as 
the area to test the concept of development rights purchases. Acqui­
sitions are to be made in a contiguous area so that an agricultural 
district is developed.
The program is working as follows:
(1) New Jersey solicits offers from farmers to sell their develop­
ment rights.
(2) Offers to sell are preliminarily evaluated, and farmland 
owners are informed of the evaluations. The major criteria for selec­
tion include price, soil classification, and proximity to other farm­
land selected for the demonstration project.
This section is taken from David J. Bardin and Phillip Alamoi Letter 
dated April 18, 1977. «'ampi, Lerar
2
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(3) Appraisals are made of those farms which appear to be candi­
dates for inclusion in the project.
(4) Following return of appraisals, preliminary selections of 
lands for inclusion are announced.
(5) Next, final negotiations and signing of contracts with owners 
is undertaken.
(6) Following some additional time for title searches, surveys, 
and other legal work, final closings, signing of deed covenants, and 
payment of monies will be made.
Purchases of development rights are to be made at prices no greater 
than the difference between the land's market value and agricultural 
value. Further, no purchases are to be finalized until all owners of 
farmland which are to be included in the project have signed purchase 
agreements. All purchases and the payment of monies are to be concluded 
before December 31, 1978.
Evaluation of Suffolk County's Development Rights Purchase Program
An evaluation of Suffolk County's farmland development rights pur­
chases should weigh the costs of the program against the benefits and 
ability of the purchases to meet the program's goals (preserve agricul­
tural economy, maintain rural environment, and provide local tax savings). 
The current legislative authorized expenditures for purchases are $55.5 
million (Klein, 1978, p. 5). This figure does not include debt service 
or legal and administrative costs, which appear to be substantial.
Lesher and Eiler (1977) have evaluated Suffolk County's program and its 
ability to meet these three objectives. Their conclusions are discussed 
in this section.
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In regard to preserving a viable agricultural economy, the program's 
ability to accomplish this task is doubtful for at least three reasons. 
First, the program is purchasing the development rights to only 15,000 
acres, approximately 1/4 of the currently available farmland. This may 
not be enough acres to maintain a critical mass for agriculture in the 
county. Second, this program is concentrating on purchasing the rights 
to land-extensive crops (i.e., potatoes), although these crops provide 
relatively little to gross farm receipts when compared to land intensive 
crops (e.g. ducks, flowers). Thus, purchases of development rights are 
concentrated on land for which the agricultural enterprises being 
operated have less chance of survival vis-a-vis more land-intensive 
enterprises. Finally, the program may encourage the development of 
small county estates since there is no prohibition to subdividing the 
land as long as it remains in agricultural production.
In achieving the second objective, the maintenance of a pleasing 
rural environment, this program may keep some land in agricultural and 
thus visually pleasing. However, even without the program, it is 
unlikely that all the agricultural land in the eastern part of the 
county will be developed in the near future. Currently, of the total 
quantity of land in Suffolk County, 270,000 acres are developed (in­
cludes land in agriculture), another 60,000 acres are permanently 
committed to recreation or conservation, and an additional 270,000 acres 
are in undeveloped use. At present rates of population growth it is 
estimated that it would take 34 years before population growth could be 
limited by the nonavailability of the 15,000 acres planned for the 
program.
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It has been argued that this program will save tax dollars (third 
objective) in the form of education costs, since school tax revenues 
from additional residential development will be less than the cost of 
providing additional educational resources (Klein, 1974). However, this 
argument assumes that one acre preserved means one acre not developed. 
But since there will not be pressure to develop these lands (assuming 
other nondeveloped land is available and present population growth 
continues) for 34 years, these savings must be discounted to have 
economic meaning.v Lesher and Eiler (1977, p. 19) found the costs of 
purchasing development rights more than four times greater than the 
savings in educational costs. Their analysis was based on the purchase 
of development rights at $6,000 an acre; however, the first purchases 
were made for approximately $3,600 per acre. Still, this is 2.5 times 
greater than the anticipated increased education costs. All other 
public services not needed would have to provide savings 2.5 times 
greater than the development rights purchase costs for the argument 
of tax savings to be valid.
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APPENDIX B
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A l a s k a , F a i r b a n k s
Fairbanks, Alaska 99701
School of Agriculture and Land Resources Management 
Agricultural Experiment Station
August 14, 1978
Dear
The Agricultural Experiment Station at the University of Alaska is conducting 
a survey of Alaskan farmers. This survey is part of a study concerning the future 
use of agricultural lands near population centers of Alaska. We need your assis­
tance to make this study a success.
Agricultural lands are rapidly being converted to other uses such as residen­
tial lots, airports, and shopping centers. Land is become more expensive and 
some farmland owners are convinced that it makes more sense to develop agricultural 
land than to farm it. Other people are concerned that we are converting too much 
of the farmland near cities to nonagricultural uses and that it would be wise to 
preserve these lands so that food can be grown close to large population centers 
and so that there will continue to be open space near urban areas.
Many ways are being tried to preserve agricultural lands in other areas of 
the United States. Some of these include tax incentives, zoning and the trading 
of land. Another way is for a state or municipality to purchase from the farmland 
owner his right to develop his land for anything but farming. For a price, the 
farmer would give up his option to use his land for nonagricultural purposes; the 
land would still be his, but he could do nothing that would impair its agricultural 
potential.
The principal objective of our study is to determine (1) farmers' interest 
in selling development rights and (2) what it might cost the State of Alaska to 
purchase these rights. A short questionnaire is enclosed and we would be grateful^ 
if you will fill it out and return it to us in the enclosed postage paid envelope 
before September 1 , 1978. All information will be kept confidential. If you 
desire we will be happy to send you a final report at the completion of the study.
Thank you for your cooperation,
Dr. William G. Workman 
Resource Economist
WGW:ks
Enclosures
A division of the University of Alaska statewide system of higher education
96
APPENDIX B - CONTINUED 
ALASKA AGRICULTURAL LANDS SURVEY
How many acres do you currently farm or ranch?
Your own land _______
Land rented or leased
From other landowners _______
From the government _______
Total acres '
What crops or livestock do you produce?
Crops _____________
Your own Rented from Leased from
land others government
Vegetables or potatoes 
Small grains 
Hay or Silage 
Planted Pasture 
Native Pasture
Livestock Number of Head Livestock Number of Head
Dairy cattle • -_______ __ Swine   ■
Beef cattle _____________ Poultry ___________
Sheep ______________ Other (specify) ______________
What do you estimate 1s the per acre market value of agricultural land:
Your own land:. Cleared___________ $/acre Uncleared_________ $/acre.
That you rent (exclude government leases): Cleared ________ _$/acre.
Would you be Interested in selling development rights to your agricultural 
land? Selling such rights would mean that your land could be used for 
agricultural or forestry purposes only.
Degree of interest Cleared Uncleared
Not Interested _______ ________ _
Slightly Interested _______ ________ _
Moderately Interested _______ _________
Highly interested _______ _________
At what price would you sell the development rights to your agricultural 
land? __________ $/acre.
Please describe the location of your farm or ranch.
Nearest town  ______ . Distance from town______
Direction from town .
Thank you for your cooperation. A summary of the results of this survey will 
be available to you on request.
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS
"Ranching on Kodiak is going down the drain. Too much government inter­
ference. After private enterprise developed it over a period of 75 years, 
the government gave our ranches to the Natives. I have just completed 22 
years,. The Wholesome Meat Act forced us to build a $150,000.00 slaughter 
house which we did not need and etc. Until the government quits trying 
to run agriculture in the state, it will decline as it has in the last 20 
years."
"This is the most ridiculous thing I ever heard of. A state with the smallest 
amount of land in private ownership and this you bureaucrats want to take away 
from us. If you want land, take from the State or U.S."
"We would need a more detailed explanation of all phases of a sale of any 
rights to our property. We intend to will our land to our boys, but it will 
be set up so that the land cannot be used for anything but farm or possibly 
forestry, ever. We hope you understand our position."
"The reason we are not interested, is because it would be such an expense to 
the state. Why can't the state give their agricultural land that they hold 
to people on the basis of long term leases, 55 years with renewal rights,
then let them have the freedom to ranch or farm just like they own it - but
if they do not use the land or show reasonable intent and action to do so -
they would lose the lease. I think the 55 year lease we have is a good one."
"A few years ago when you started telling people they had to do something 
or lose their lease, I know, personally, of several that moved onto them and
started trying to farm or raise cattle."
"The agricultural land sales you have been having are sickening. Speculators
and people looking for summer places bid them up until people who will and
know how to use the land for agriculture can't afford to touch it. The 
policies at the land office change so fast a person trying to do anything 
are unable to make long range plans. Given them a headquarters sight to own, 
land to work with then get off their backs and let them do it. This survey 
is a good idea. Hope the people making the final decision have horse sense 
along with "Book Learning!!!"
"If the state is interested in keeping farms and green areas near town, I'd 
suggest that the state develop farms (with state held land) as they are doing 
in Delta but lease them out - not sell "agricultural rights" - full rights 
(Developmental) - can quickly be given back to these "farmers" (lawyers, doc­
tors, districts and anyone else who needs a tax shelter). When the farms fold 
and there is other need for the land since agriculture proved to be "not 
economi cally feasible."
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"I can't see selling my developmental rights because I've given up my right 
to property as quaranteed by the Constitution. My property near Fairbanks 
will probably become homes, etc. in the not too distant future. You people 
are 15 years late in your concern for farmers etc. Most people who wanted
to farm have left the area. The real estate people have reaped the benefits
from the necessary development which has taken place due to pouplation 
increase."
"A few questions:
1. The state now holds most of the land. Buying the developmental 
rights would put the state in more control of the land, (land that is in 
private hands now). That's socialism.
2. What's to prevent the State from developing the land for other 
uses? It would be a simple matter to buy the less costly agricultural 
rights. You wouldn't even have to threaten the owner with eminent domain 
since he doesn't own much anyway.
3. If I wanted to farm Tike they do in Iowa or California - I'd go
there - it's better farming country. Farming here is marginal - but free.
Keep the government the hell out of farming."
"I believe a man should be able to own his property in fee simple from center 
of earth to outer space and that what I do with it or on it is my business 
as owner and no person, group of persons, bureaucrat government entity can 
dictate to. me what I do on it or with it as long as I am not infringing on 
rights of others. Their rights don't include telling me I can't build a 
trailer court or junk yard or hog farm. Therefore, I am opposed to buying 
agricultural rights with taxpayers money and also to zoning. Tax incentives 
might be. a method of approach to keep our lands in agriculture - maybe some 
smart persons can come up with better methods - but incentive methods are 
acceptable - dictatorial zoning methods are not."
"In our area it would be rather expensive for the state to purchase rights, 
being the development value of land in our area has just reached $4,500 
per acre as is - changed or not. To have land subdivided, selling price 
has gone to a high of $9,000 per 40,000 square feet. Also our area has 
started to be listed as being close to the recreation sight - which increases 
the price more. Would be nice to have farm land remain under cultivation 
rather than subdivisions. Subdivisions belong in the hills."
"Farmers should have control locally of their financial institutions as in 
the rest of America. Alaska will never have a decent agricultural industry 
under present set-up."
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"I have felt for a long time that if the State wanted to keep farm land they 
should pay for it. I feel anyone who buys land with no strings attached 
should be able to do what they want with it. I also feel that good farm 
ground should be kept for that purpose. However, circumstances sometimes 
force people to do things they do not really want to do. I also think a 
fruitful farm could be as small as ten (10) acres, possibly 5 acres. I 
would like your opinion on this."
"I feel the only fair way agricultural land can be kept for agricultural 
purposes is to pay owner difference between commercial price and agricultural 
sale price at whatever time the owner decides to sell. Because prices are 
changing everyday, some wish to retain land to take advantage of rising 
prices, others are satisfied to live on their property and farm it."
"I hope you can interest the state in this as I don't want to subdivide but 
I feel it will be necessary within 2 years to reduce debt loss."
"We did try to farm. Had a loan from the Agricultural Revolving loan fund. 
When we got our cattle they wouldn't loan any more for machinery so we are 
stuck years paying it off."
"I feel that if a person wants to farm his land he will do so - not because 
of government or for government but because he is a farmer. Government has 
no right to subsidize any one segment of America without being obligated to 
every American living today, which they are almost doing now."
"I can't believe someone is being paid to ask these questions. Farmers, have 
been forced out over the years by the financial clique - you are wasting 
your time."
"We've been here since '55 and wish things to stay as they are on our place."
"The land would produce 3, 4, or 5 times as much as it does now with 1 or 2 
houses per acre, with people occupying them that are more educated along the 
self sufficiency line and with the ambition and incentive to do so."
"I want to farm. I am not interested in sellirig my land. I hope I don't 
have to sell for any reason."r 4
"I have pushed this concept for years, and believe it is the only good possi­
ble approach."
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"Because of low market prices and high production costs there is likelihood 
of negative value for agricultural land."
"We think the interest in agricultural lands is about 5 years too late - 
much of the land in this area has been sub-divided."
"Not interested. Feel Matanuska Valley is lost to developers already. Land 
left is too small of parcels.1
"We filed on 640 acres, but land was withdrawn. Seems unlikely we can ever 
raise livestock as planned (had a couple dozen sows, 2 big boars, beef and 
dairy stock, etc.). Have sold all of hogs, most of cattle, and no longer try 
to grow grain. Just am trying to survive till remainder of kids are grown."
"I don't do much farming, we have 4 horses - I raise feed for them. I believe 
a tax break for farm land to help keep it as farm land would be one way that 
might help. I am also concerned about our farm land that is being used for 
other purposes - the good land should be set aside for farming only."
"I am sorry for the condition of the survey sheet and for not putting this 
reaction of mine in more of a standard form but when my temper flares I have 
to get the words down as quick as possible or I get so mad I can't remember 
them all.
I realize that you have no control over any of this and are simply taking 
a survey but maybe you know the right people to pass this word on to and 
that's why I'm sending this letter along with my thoughts on the back of the 
survey sheet.
I'm not necessarily ujd on the news and current legislations, etc., so can't 
outright argue with anyone except on one point and that's human nature.
People will put up with rules and have even if they don't particularly agree 
with them - but our nation and our state are making a big mistake. They have 
been shoving laws and rules down our throats for so long and no one has said 
much because Alaskans being what they are, have never complained much, but 
its all being over done. We the people? Yes, we the people, we're getting 
a belly full. You do a little reading on the 3rd Riech and then step back, 
clear your mind and compare.
All in all I'd say your survey is fine. The tax incentives, the land trade, 
even the zoning and purchase of all but agricultural option of land use would 
be O.K. except for this one thing. If it ever gets started even as a freedom 
of choice, it's just a matter of time until these better interest groups make 
it a law. Then what happens to we the people and our freedom of choice? Gun 
Controls, Price Controls, Fuel Rationing, D-2 Lands, Native Land Claims - what 
is wrong with everybody? Do We the People really look that stupid?"
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"To come to the final point of all this gibberish - I think your survey 
should be conducted with every Alaskan voter and be arrived at getting more 
agricultural land available and through the state and federal not through 
individuals and a Tittle financial assistance for the farmers that he can 
afford - not setting up a means of depriving him of his freedom to sell out 
to the highest bidder and forcing him to sell to the lowest. If the state 
wants to buy up my rights they are for sale but after they buy them at 
current market values they'll own that chunk of ground and they can kill 
themselves trying to get a crop off of it if they want. If they buy the 
rights, then they buy the whole thing - but at my price - not theirs.
My father wouldn't have married his wife as she is Catholic if he hadn't 
have made sure that his kids didn't have to be Catholic when they were born.
I won't make a decision now that will take away my children and grandchildrens' 
freedom of choice 50 years from now even if I have to put up a 10 foot 
barbed wire fence and run guard dogs and shoot the damned tax assessor and 
all of the State Bureaucracy."
"Unless a person is given a choice. There seems to be too many mandatory laws 
as things stand. This is supposed to be a free country. As far as future 
planning you'll find that most farmers are more concerned with feeding people 
than the officials who want all of these controls. Who ever heard of a farm 
in the middle of a city anyway? Left alone this will take care of itself.
As a city grows and rural areas become populated the ranchers near town become 
housing projects and the farmer moved to the new rural areas further out. We 
truck food all over the nation and world - why all the hassle over 10 miles?
I haul hay 100 miles to Anchorage and have even sold to stock owners in 
Fairbanks 260 miles North. You are not asking the right questions here. The 
problem lies in the fact that there's not enough private land out here so that 
when property prices near the city go up the farmer can sell out and buy more 
land 20 miles out. Why shouldn't the farmer be able to make a little money off 
of his investment? Is it true that since in our nation's history farmers have 
always been those poor, dumb, people with the buck toothed kids and the 1950 
Ford or Chevy pickup and in hock to the bank for everything they have, tftat 
we have to stay that way? Just becuase the Governor, Secretary of Interior 
is afraid to open up land to farming as they used to do, I don't tell a pro­
perty owner in Anchorage or Fairbanks whether or not he can sell - so what's 
the difference with the farmer? The problem is not with disappearing agricul­
tural ground. It's with the non-renewing of it. To hell with free land to 
Alaskan residents, to hell with State controlled agricultural ground (Hammond's 
law for agricultural lease sell is more like something Hitler would come up 
with). Take and open up some of this State and Federal land to homesteading 
with even tighter agricultural oriented rules and then with this same money 
you would buy up all other property rights now, set up a low interest, federal 
or state loan establishment for farmers. Give the man the land, help finance 
his start and then what happens. Most farmers are like me. Part of the reason 
they are farmers is because they don't like cities. Why shouldn't I be able 
to sell out at a profit and move to another location? Too much government 
we've got. Too much private land we don't got."
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APPENDIX D
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND CONTROL TECHNIQUES
Various techniques are currently in use, or have been proposed for 
use, to control or influence development of privately owned agricultural 
land. Four of these methods— (1) public purchase in fee simple, (2) 
public purchase of less than fee simple, (3) direct regulation (tradi­
tional zoning), and (4) taxation--were recognized prior to 1960 (Ishee, 
1977, p. 89). Since 1960, three specific techniques, agricultural 
districts, zoning by eminent domain, and transfer of development rights, 
have been proposed as new tools useful in solving the real or imagined 
misallocation of private lands.1 Although this report is concerned with 
the cost and effectiveness of the purchase of development rights (public 
purchase of less than fee simple) as an agricultural land control 
measure, it is useful to define briefly and examine other available tools.
Public Purchase in Fee Simple 
One possible method for keeping land in agriculture is through 
public purchase in fee simple. Obviously, any land purchased by govern­
ments could be used for any purposes desired. Purchases could be either 
through voluntary agreements with land owners or through the use of 
eminent domain. The use of eminent domain has a long history of use in
1 Zoning by eminent domain i§ actually not a new idea. It originated 
around the turn of the century and was used briefly in St. Paul, 
Minneapolis, and Kansas City. However, its use was not extensive 
and its recent rediscovery by Hagman (1972, 1974) allows the concept 
to be viewed as new. Transferable development rights schemes have 
had even less use, and all since 1960.
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the United States as a means of acquiring land for such things as parks 
or highways. Recently, some states have extended authorization of 
emiment domain to include open space lands.
The use of fee simple purchase of agricultural land to keep land in 
agriculture has seldom* if ever, occurred in the United States. If such 
a program of public purchase of private land was instituted, one form 
might be government purchase of land and then the resale or lease of the 
land's agricultural rights back to either the original owner or another 
party, restricting the uses for which the land could be employed (Gray, 
1975, p. 6). This might be the only way the land would stay in produc­
tion, since a government may have a difficult time managing a farm.
Although not a public purchase in fee simple, another technique 
discussed by Gray (1975, p. 6) is public lease of private lands. 
Advantages of this procedure may include the smaller costs of lease 
compared with purchase and the possible willingness of land owners to 
lease land versus relinquishing total ownership.
Direct Regulation
The most common method of land use control in the United States has 
been direct regulation, commonly referred to as zoning. Since the 
1920's, each of the 50 states has passed enabling legislation allowing 
local governments to regulate land use through zoning. Following Ervin, 
et al. (1977, p. 61), "zoning is the practice of dividing a land area 
such as a city or county into districts within which only specific 
activities may take place." Zoning is derived from the police power of 
the state. The police power "involves the sovereign power of governments
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to limit personal liberties and property rights in the interest of 
public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare" (Barlowe, 1972, 
pp. 391-392). Because zoning has been found by courts to be a proper 
use of the police power, compensation is not required for individuals 
who are damaged by this action.
Zoning has been used typically as an urban land control measure and
has been used largely to protect residential housing values. Zoning
began in Boston during the years 1904-1905 when districts with varying
o
building heights were established. Los Angeles was the second city to 
use zoning; in the period 1909-1911 it established seven industrial 
districts separated from residential areas. The first comprehensive 
zoning ordinance, however, was passed in New York in 1916. This ordi­
nance provided building height, bulk, and setback requirements through­
out the city. Following these first uses, many questioned the legality 
of zoning and it was not until 1926 that a definitive court ruling on 
zoning was delivered. In the case Village of Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co., 
the United States Supreme Court held that zoning was a proper use of the 
police power. Following this ruling, zoning has become the dominant 
land use control measure in the United States.
In only a few instances has zoning been used directly in the 
United States in an attempt to preserve agricultural areas. California 
has applied zoning on the county level to agriculture, while Hawaii has 
had state agricultural zoning for several years (Libby and Newman, 1977, 
p. 8; Gray, 1975, p. 4). In the case of California, zoning has been
2 This history of zoning was drawn from David E. Ervin, et al., Land 
Use Control: Evaluating Economic and Political Effects, Bollinger
Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977.
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ineffective in limiting development. An example is Santa Clara, California, 
which found zoning not to be effective in maintaining agriculture.
During the years it has zoned for agriculture, the area has gone from a 
major fruit growing center to a major electronics center. This is not 
an isolated example because zoning is difficult to maintain when there 
is intense pressure to development. Zoning boards normally grant 
variances under heavy citizen pressure. This is not all bad since 
planning tools should be flexible.
Currently, some states are giving zoning a new look as a develop­
ment control device. Several townships near Detroit have zoned areas as 
Agricultural-Industrial Zones and are planning to exclude activities not 
conductive to farming (Libby and Newman, 1977, p. 8). In 1977, a bill 
passed the Wisconsin State Legislature allowing for the zoning of 
exclusive agricultural areas in some Wisconsin counties by 1982 
(Barrows, 1977). These ordinances, if passed, wilt exclude nonagri- 
cultural development. Outside of the United States, the Province of 
British Columbia has established a network of agricultural reserves; 
land in these reserves must stay in agriculture.
Taxation
Traditionally, private property has been assessed for property tax 
purposes at market value. It has been argued that this assessment 
procedure can at times force farmers out of agriculture, although they 
desire to remain in farming. The logic is as follows: agricultural
land near expanding urban areas face increasing tax burdens when the
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value of land increases as development pressures increase. Where pro­
perty taxes are a large segment of production costs, a property tax may 
make farming uneconomical. If, however, farmland is assessed at use- 
value (value of land in specific use, in this case agriculture) it has 
been argued that farmers will be able and will often elect to continue 
production, instead of selling their farms for development.
Following Hady (1977), use-value assessment laws can take three 
general forms. These are (1) preferential assessment, (2) deferred tax, 
and (3) restrictive agreements. Under preferential assessment, agricul­
tural land is assessed at use-value instead of market value. No penal­
ties are imposed if the land is developed. The second form, deferred 
taxation, is currently the most widely used by states. Under these 
programs, agriculture is assessed at use-value; however, if land is 
developed an additional tax is due. The final form, restrictive agree­
ments, require farmers to sign contracts agreeing to keep land in agri­
cultural production if use-value assessment is to be received. As of 
1976, about 40 states, including Alaska, had passed use-value assessment 
laws in response to the "farmer forced to sell" argument (Collins, 1976, 
p. 185).
Generally, the most commonly used use-value assessment programs 
(deferred taxation) work as follows: as long as a farmer continues in
agriculture he is assessed at use-value. If, however, the land is sold 
for other uses, a tax bill is due on the property for the sum of the 
difference between the use-value assessment and what would have been the 
market value assessment. Normally, this development tax is rolled back
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for a number of years, commonly three to seven, and usually an interest 
charge is added, often six percent.3
Studies of the success of use-value assessment in preserving 
agricultural lands have shown discouraging results. These studies have 
found use-value assessment: (1) does not effect the conversion of
agricultural land to other uses: (2) at best only temporarily holds land 
in agriculture; and (3) benefits those who would have continued in 
agriculture in any case (Ishee, 1977, p. 94).
Agricultural Districts4 
New York is an example of a state which has. adopted a program of 
agricultural districts to try to keep land in agriculture. Once formed, 
these districts provide a variety of incentives for agricultural pro­
duction. First, farms are assessed at their use-value, instead of 
at market value. Next, local governments are prohibited from enacting 
ordinances which restrict farm practices or structures beyond that 
required for health or safety. Third, state agencies must modify 
regulations and procedures to encourage agriculture to the extent 
possible under existing health, safety, and federal regulations.
Fourth, agencies are required to give serious consideration to alter-
q
In some states, for example California, these programs take the form 
of restrictive agreements. In California, for a farmer to receive 
use-value assessment a ten or twenty year nondevelopmept contract 
is signed. For a ten year contract, the contract is automatically 
annually renewed; for a twenty year contract* renewal is automatic 
after ten years. If a farmer gives a nonrenewal notice, the assess 
ment is increased yearly until by the end of the ten years the pro­
perty is assessed at market value.
4 This discussion of agricultural districts is from William G. Lesher, 
Land Use Legislation in the Northeast: New York, A.E. Research 75-23,
Cornell University, January, 1975.
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native areas before farmland is taken by eminent domain for public 
purposes. Next, the right of agencies to advance funds that would 
encourage nonfarm development are modified. Finally, the power of 
special districts to make special assessments on farmland for sewer, 
water, lights, Or maximum drainage is limited.
Zoning by Eminent Domain
It is often argued that zoning is unsatisfactory as a land control 
technique because it is inequitable, i.e., some individuals are losers 
While others are gainers. The gains and losses are due to the increase 
or decrease in land values following zoning. Although those gaining as 
a result of zoning will justify its use for the public good, those 
losing, if politically able, will restrict zoning's use. In addition, 
losers will argue that any one individual should not reap major benefits 
from an activity pursued in the public's interest. In response to this 
problem of wipeouts and windfalls, two techniques, zoning by eminent 
domain and transfer of development rights, have been proposed as poten­
tial solutions. Zoning by eminent domain is discussed in this section, 
with a discussion of transfer of development rights in the following 
section.
Zoning by eminent domain, as described by Hagman (1974), would work 
as follows. As a start, land would be zoned in the traditional manner 
as, for example, residential, industrial, or possibly agricultural or 
open space. The zoning authority (city, county, etc.) acquires the 
development rights for all other purposes not permitted under the zoning
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ordinance. Land owners are then paid damages for any loss in land 
values due to the removal of development rights. Conversely, those who 
have gained as a result of zoning are taxed through a special assessment 
to capture these increases in land values. It is theoretically possible 
for the value recaptured from gainers to completely compensate the 
losers. However, as a practical result this is difficult to determine 
without actual experience.
Zoning by eminent domain had limited use near the turn of the 
century. The widest application was in Minnesota when a zoning act 
based on eminent domain was passed in 1915. A more limited use of 
zoning by eminent domain occurred in Kansas City in 1893. In addition, 
a short-lived experiment with the concept occurred in a Wisconsin 
village in 1917. The problems of zoning by eminent domain that have 
been identified for the Minnesota experience are probably applicable for 
all these early experiments. Ervin, et al. (1977, p. 106), citing 
Anderson (1927), indicates the major problems as "(1) the cost of 
condemning restricted properties and identifying, measuring, and deter­
mining property value adjustments, (2) the possibility that property 
owners in restricted districts would falsely announce development 
intentions and thereby receive damages, and (3) the inflexibility 
of land use patterns in a district once restrictions were applied." 
Hagman (1974, p. 126) suggests that computerization and greater experi­
ence with zoning by eminent domain could overcome at least some of the 
problems associated with the technique.
n o
Transferable Development Rights 
A second technique which has been suggested to overcome zoning's 
difficulties in protecting agriculture and open space lands, and also 
overcoming the problems of windfalls and wipeouts, is transferable 
development rights. Although several forms of transferable development 
rights schemes have been noted in the literature (Chavooshian, et al., 
1973; Rose, 1975; Clark, 1977; Ishee, 1977; Ervin, et al., 1977), the 
general proposal is as follows. The process starts as areas are iden­
tified for preservation or increased development. Land owners in areas 
where development is prohibited are issued certificates (TDRs) as com­
pensation for the loss in property values. TDRs are also issued to land 
owners in areas where intensified development is to take place. For 
certain types of development, specific numbers of TDRs are required. 
However, land owners in areas scheduled for increased development will 
own fewer TDRs than would be required for the expected development.
They must then purchase TDRs from land owners in areas of prohibited 
development if the new development is to take place. The lure of 
transferable development rights proposals is that a private market is 
created to deal with the problem of windfalls and wipeouts.
In actual practice, the only use of transferable developments 
rights has been to preserve historic buildings in New York City and 
Washington, D.C. (Ervin, et al., 1977, pp. 132-134). Also, a small 
transferable development rights program has been instituted to preserve 
open space in a small Vermont hamlet. These current uses are on a small 
scale, and although larger proposals have been made in a few states, 
none have been authorized.
Il l
Sale of Agricultural Rights 
Alaska has large quantities of potential cropland in state and 
federal ownership. A small amount of the state owned land that has been 
classified as agricultural land has been transferred to private owner­
ship. In an attempt to develop a viable agricultural economy, the state 
is using a unique technique to put this land in agriculture. In the 
disposal of these lands, only the fee simple agricultural rights are 
being sold. Two noteworthy examples are the Tanana Loop sale and the 
Delta sale. Small amounts of Matanuska-Susitna Borough lands which con­
tain only agricultural rights have also been transferred into private 
ownership. Advantages of this procedure include the insurance of at 
least an attempt to put undeveloped land into agriculture and the lower 
cost to farmers for the land because only the agricultural rights are 
purchased. Since this is not a traditional type of real property owner­
ship, problems may arise between the state and the farmers as to what 
exactly can be done on the farm. A second problem may arise if the land 
is or becomes uneconomical to the landowner to farm. What then happens 
to the development rights on the land? Can they then be repurchased by 
the current agricultural rights owner thus allowing him to more inten­
sively develop the land, or must the land remain in agriculture? The 
current Alaska Statutes allow for the conveyance or lease of the remaining 
interests in the land if it is determined to be in the public interest. 
This conveyance or lease is to be at public auction witlr the landowner 
having a preference right to meet the high bid within 30 days after 
the day of the auction.
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